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The Europeans can be proud as they look back on fifty years of peaceful integration. 
Nowadays many people in the world see the European Union as a model of how states 
and their citizens can work together in peace and in freedom. However, this achievement 
does not automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the 
future in a rapidly changing world. For this reason the European Union needs to keep 
developing its unity in diversity in a dynamic way, be it with regard to energy issues, 
the euro, climate change or new types of conflict. Self-assertion and solidarity are the 
fundamental concepts which will shape the forthcoming discourse.
“Europe in Dialogue“ wishes to make a contribution to this open debate. The analyses 
in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny and 
suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it is fit 
for the future. However, “Europe in Dialogue“ is not merely trying to encourage an intra-
European debate, and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states. Looking 
at an issue from a different angle or from a distance often helps to facilitate the crucial 
change of perspective which in turn makes it possible to continue to develop Europe in 
a meaningful way and to engage in a critical and yet courteous discourse with other 
civilizations and continents.
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How to use this book
Dear Reader,
You have just picked up and opened the first volume of the
Europe in Dialogue series. Europe in Dialogue seeks to enliven
the debate about the future of the European project by providing a
forum in which creative approaches can make themselves heard.
In this volume we are adding to the current debate about the
future shape of relations between the EU and its eastern
neighbours by publishing three policy papers which evaluate the
EU and its policies from the vantage point of the South Caucasus.
We have invited three analysts from the South Caucasus to
contribute a personal analysis of the current relationship between
the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and to give policy
recommendations for what should be done within the framework of
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the recently
established Eastern Partnership (EaP).
Tigran Mkrtchyan is a political analyst who lives and works in
Yerevan. Tabib Huseynov is one of the leading Azerbaijani
political analysts of the younger generation. He works for the
International Crisis Group in Baku and Tbilisi. Kakha Gogolashvili
supervises EU studies at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic
and International Studies in Tbilisi.
Mkrtchyan, Huseynov and Gogolashvili present critical and
very candid accounts which examine not only European
policymaking, but also the factors which determine the variousEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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national policies. On this basis they make some straightforward
recommendations.
The contributions by Mkrtchyan, Huseynov and Gogolashvili
are preceded by an executive summary and our preface which
places the essays in the context of the current debate on the
nature of the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbours.
The debate about the EU’s relations with its eastern
neighbours continues unabated. For this reason at the end of this
volume we have included an annotated selection of current
analyses and position papers prepared by think tanks and NGOs
on the relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours.
The views expressed in the articles of this book express the views
of the authors.
The Editors, Europe in DialogueEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Executive Summary
Armenia and the EU
Tigran Mkrtchyan singles out three main factors that determine
Armenia’s rather positive attitude to and interest in EU policies in
the Caucasus region. Firstly, further cooperation with the EU could
guarantee a democratically stable future for the country. Secondly,
Armenia would benefit from increased economic cooperation with
the EU. Thirdly, to a large extent the population feels that it
belongs to Europe. However, some critics, mostly from the ranks
of the intelligentsia, have expressed concern that too much
Europeanization constitutes a threat to national identity.
Despite the auspicious beginnings, several conflicts threaten to
impede regional cooperation in general and cooperation between
Armenia and the EU in particular. These conflicts include the one
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, long-standing tensions between
Armenia and Turkey, and the recent Russo-Georgian war.
Furthermore, the slow internal democratization process is holding
up more courageous regional projects. Finally, Armenia’s political
and economic dependence on Russia hampers its ability to fully
participate in regional projects. Mkrtchyan makes suggestions how
the EU could gain a more active role in order to support Armenia’s
transformation.
Azerbaijan and the EU
Tabib Huseynov agrees with Mkrtchyan in calling for a more active
EU role in the region and most notably in the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This would lay the foundations for the
ongoing development of the region.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Huseynov outlines factors contributing to or impeding regional
cooperation in the South Caucasus and cooperation between the
EU and Azerbaijan. Whereas Georgia and Armenia are seeking
EU membership in the long term and financial assistance in some
areas, Azerbaijan remains financially independent on account of
its oil revenues and is not interested in EU membership in the near
future. It is far more interested in increased economic and trade
cooperation.
Since the beginning of the 1990s the basis for Azerbaijani EU
policy has changed dramatically. After attaining financial
independence and having consolidated their power, the elites
gradually toned down their pro-Western rhetoric that had once
served to counter Russian influence in the country. Since it does
not wish to antagonize Russia, the Azerbaijani government
pursues a balanced foreign policy strategy. While it is
economically important for Azerbaijan, the EU occupies only a
secondary position in the minds of the elite because of its inability
to speak with one voice and to guarantee security in the region.
Nevertheless, the EU receives support from a relative majority
of the population. Thus Huseynov asserts that the extent to which
European initiatives in the country and region can succeed will
depend on the EU’s ability to offer attractive incentives in the main
policy areas of conflict resolution, energy issues and the
promotion of democracy.
Huseynov argues that the EU should adopt an even-handed
and multi-speed approach to its eastern partners. Such an
approach would encourage healthy rivalry between the countries
of the region.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Georgia and the EU
Kakha Gogolashvili, Director of EU Studies at the Georgian
Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS),
describes the level of acceptance for EU policies in Georgia. To a
large extent the general goals of Georgian policy-makers are
aligned with those of the EU, and this facilitates cooperation in
implementing reforms in the country.
Although the Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership
represent positive developments in EU-Caucasian relations,
Gogolashvili calls into question whether the EU will succeed in
carrying out a non-discriminatory and transparent energy security
policy without an escalating diplomatic conflict with Russia. The
EU would be well advised to promote forums in which Black Sea
littoral states that are gravitating toward the EU can discuss
related problems amongst themselves.
The recurrent confrontation between Russia and NATO in the
region could deter the EU from expanding its activities in the area.
Furthermore, the global financial crisis may affect regional
cooperation projects on account of a lack of resources, by
diminishing the credibility of some of the states involved and by
encouraging the emergence of isolationist policies in others.
According to Gogolashvili, only a more active role will improve the
EU’s image in the Caucasus and increase acceptance of
European state-building models.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Preface
Armando García Schmidt
The EU has always been concerned to impart clarity to its
dealings with its neighbours. However, it is faced with a dilemma,
since it can no longer or perhaps does not even wish to resort to
enforcing discipline by means of the tempting prospect of EU
membership. At the same time the challenges are getting bigger,
for the EU would like to be surrounded not only by a ring of stable
and friendly states.
There is growing pressure to do justice to the normative
demands of the European project. But how can the ideas of
democracy, juridification of relations between neighbouring states
and the wish for increasingly close cross-border links between
states and their inhabitants be applied to such a diverse
neighbourhood? And geostrategic questions are becoming more
volatile on a daily basis. How can energy supply lines be made
secure? How does one deal with violent conflicts within and
between states which happen to be in the immediate vicinity? How
does one deal with Russia’s self-confident and aggressive belief
that it has the right to tell others what to do, which did not first
become apparent at the time of the war in Georgia in August
2008?
Strategic positioning of neighbourhood policy
Whether or not the European project can assert itself depends
primarily on the strategic positioning of its neighbourhood policy.
The last five years have seen a dramatic increase in the number
of publications and European concepts on how to deal with theEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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EU’s neighbourhood. However, the actors were slow to
understand the significance of the South Caucasus. In 2003, when
the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the
South Caucasus was initially not even included. This reflects “not
only the geographical, but also the mental distance separating the
region from EU policymakers”, explains Tabib Huseynov, who has
written one of the essays in this volume.
There is an inverse relationship between this mental distance
and the importance of the region for Europe, and the demands
made by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, the EU has
progressively increased the level of involvement in its eastern
neighbourhood, including the South Caucasus, by establishing
new bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks. This can be
seen in the Union’s increased engagement within the ENP, the
Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the newly established Eastern
Partnership (EaP). The EU is also seeking a more active role in
the resolution of regional conflicts, as can be seen from its
September 2008 decision to send a mission to Georgia.
And yet the observers from the region reach rather critical
conclusions. Huseynov, for example, says: “The success of these
initiatives has yet to be seen, given that they do not yet constitute
a coherent policy. Rather, they represent a product of ongoing
reflection on the nature of EU involvement, and thus serve as
building blocks of an emerging EU vision for the region.” It remains
to be seen, in the final analysis, whether or not the EaP is a tool
which can actually create a clearer vision of the relations between
the EU and the states of the South Caucasus. At any rate, a
symbolic start was made in Prague on May 7.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Assessment of EU’s policy toward the South Caucasus
One thing is certain. The EU’s increased interest in the South
Caucasus makes it necessary to critically reassess its policies in
the region and clarify the contours of future engagement. The
critical assessment is supplied by the three authors of this volume.
Tigran Mkrtchyan, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) Research
Analyst in Armenia, Tabib Huseynov, one of Azerbaijan’s leading
young political analysts working for the International Crisis Group
(ICG), and Kakha Gogolashvili, Director of EU Studies at the
Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies
(GFSIS), have taken a close look at the relations between
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the EU.
The three countries are in many ways comparable, but there
are many conditions leading to very different developments.
Mkrtchyan, Huseynov and Gogolashvili draw a vivid and
differentiated picture of the prevailing perceptions, fears and
strategic interests of the three countries in the South Caucasus.
Their recommendations are rather similar, since they believe
that the EU should enhance its involvement and presence in the
South Caucasus. The populations in all three countries see
themselves as part of the family of European nations. And all three
states are of the opinion that the EU can act as a motor for their
transformation processes and economic development.
A more active role of the EU is needed
The analysts make some very specific suggestions, including an
enhancement of the role of the EU in the efforts to resolve the
existing conflicts in the region. All three know only too well that the
EU cannot and does not wish to be a guarantor of security in theEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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region. But it should stop the rhetorical ambiguities with regard to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and take a clear stance with regard
to the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The authors are
aware of the fact that the EU cannot pursue a policy that is in
opposition to Russia. “By demonstrating the ‘power of soft power’
the EU should by no means attempt any ‘isolation’ of Russia in the
region,” warns Mkrtchyan. “Any such attempt would fatally fail the
progressive development of the countries of the region”.
By taking on a more active role in the region, explains
Gogolashvili, “the EU will not only improve its image there but
ease a wider acceptance of the values and models of state-
building that the EU tends to promote throughout its
neighbourhood”. All authors agree that the EU should retain its
regional approach, providing equal integration opportunities to all
aspiring partners. And it should apply the same criteria in
assessing their progress. However, suggest Huseynov, “the EU
should employ a more evident multi-speed strategy in its dealings
with the eastern partners”. Such an “equal opportunity, multi-
speed” approach would serve to maximize the EU’s soft power
and would allow for a positive rivalry, explains the analyst from
Baku.
All three authors thus place their hopes in the EaP. “With its
emphases on deeper bilateral and multilateral cooperation
frameworks the EaP would become the most ambitious EU
program implemented in the region”, writes Mkrtchyan. But, as
Huseynov writes, the success of the initiative has yet to be seen. It
is one step more, hopefully in the right direction.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
Preface | 13
But Europe is still in need of a coherent policy towards the
South Caucasus and its other eastern neighbours – this is the
core message of the three policy papers.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Armenia’s European Future
Tigran Mkrtchyan
I. Armenia’s interests in EU policies
Since Armenia’s independence in 1991, three factors have driven
the country into a policy orientation toward Europe. First, with the
successful completion of the European Union’s enlargement
rounds and Europe’s relatively long political stability and economic
growth, Armenian political elites have thought and occasionally
stated that EU involvement in the region, along with close relations
with the EU, could serve as a guarantee for a democratic and
secure future. Every year, Armenia’s foreign minister states in his
annual January briefings that a European orientation represents a
top priority for Armenia’s foreign policy. Successive Armenian
presidents have publicly agreed (Noyan Tapan 2003).
Guarantee for democracy and security
After its independence in 1991, Armenia heavily got involved in
bilateral and multilateral projects with the EU through TACIS
National Programme, EU support to Armenia in institutional, legal
and administrative reforms, EU support in addressing social
consequences of transition, regional programs (e.g. SME
investment support, INOGATE, TRACECA, etc.), Food security
programme, macro-financial assistance, EIDHR, Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and European Neighbourhood
Policy. Armenia is also open to inputs from the newly created
Eastern Partnership.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Armenia signed its PCA with the European Union in 1996.
Three years later, in 1999, this agreement came into force, and
has remained the fundamental contractual basis of EU-Armenian
relations. In 2001, Armenia became a member of the Council of
Europe. Through the European Neighbourhood Action Plan with
Armenia, published on March 2, 2005, Armenia was invited “to
enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural
relations with the European Union, enhanced regional and cross-
border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention
and conflict resolution” (Armenia Foreign Ministry 2005). The ENP
Action Plan specifies eight high-priority areas for cooperation
between Armenia and the European Union, of which only the
seventh and eighth concern regional relations and conflict
resolution. The others focus on (1) democratic structures, the rule
of law, judicial reforms and combating corruption, (2) respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, (3) economic
development and poverty reduction issues, environmental
protection, (4) improvement of investment climate, (5) the
convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices,
and (6) the development of energy strategy.
The internal development of Armenia in accordance with a
democratic and free-market spirit is therefore considered to be the
cornerstone of the ENP Action Plan. It is little wonder that Tigran
Torosyan, the former speaker of the Armenian parliament, would
confirm that “European integration touches not only upon the
foreign relations of the country, but the internal development as
well” (Torosyan 2007 and 2008: 19) The ENP is seen by the
Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a “useful anchor for
reforms” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006: 17).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
16 | Armenia’s European Future
Economic relations
The second factor characterizing Armenian interests in regional
EU involvement relates primarily to economic matters. Since 2003,
EU countries have been major export destinations for Armenian
products. EU products have been extensively imported into
Armenia as well. Thus, Europe has become a major economic
partner for Armenia. For example, in 2003 Belgium (accounting for
18.1 percent of Armenian exports), the United Kingdom (6.2
percent) and Germany (6.5 percent) were three leading
destinations for Armenian products, with Belgium taking a larger
share even than Russia (13.8 percent). In 2004, Belgium was
again Armenia's leading export destination (14.9 percent), with
Germany being the third-biggest destination (11.5 percent). Both
countries that year exceeded Russia as an export market (10.8
percent). However, Russia remained the largest source of
imported goods, accounting for a 13.9 percent share of Armenia's
imports, followed by Belgium (7.6 percent).
In 2005, exports from Armenia into European countries
increased, with Germany (15.6 percent), Netherlands (13.7
percent) and Belgium (12.8 percent) proving to be the top three
destinations. Belgium (8.0 percent) and Germany (7.8 percent)
accounted for the country's second- and the third-largest share of
imports, following Russia (13.5 percent). In 2006, Germany (15.0
percent), Netherlands (12.9 percent), Russia (12.3 percent) and
Belgium (11.0 percent) were still the leading destinations for
Armenian exports.
In 2006, the European Union as a whole accounted for a 54.4
percent share of Armenia's exports, while 34.6 percent of
Armenian imports originated in EU member states (StatisticalEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Yearbook of Armenia 2007). In 2007, Armenian export to the EU
reached 563 million US Dollar (compared to 355 million US Dollar
exports to the CIS countries (including Russia)), and the cost of
the imports to Armenia from the EU countries reached US Dollar
1.135.330 (again exceeding the total of CIS (inc. Russia) imports
reaching 1.078.699 US Dollar) (Statistical Yearbook of Armenia
2008).
Hence, the EU has become the major trade partner for
Armenia. That trade and economic interests have helped drive
Armenia’s interests in regional EU policies is verified by the words
of ex-Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Armen Baibourdyan, who
noted that a free trade agreement with the European Union could
be one of the results of the ENP Action Plan (Khachatrian 2006).
Part of the European civilization
Thirdly, Armenia is situated in a geopolitically complicated region,
which has long played host to rival civilizations and political
alliances. Nevertheless, the Armenian public has long felt itself to
be part of the wider European civilization. The country has a rich
historical past characterized by continuous contacts with the
European powers (Hellenic world, Roman Republic and Empire,
and the Byzantine Empire) and was the first state to adopt
Christianity as a state religion, in 301 A.D. Armenian society has
thus felt itself to be a bearer of European values, even if now
alienated from the European core (see below).
Arman Kirakossian, the former Armenian ambassador to the
United States and the current deputy foreign affairs minister, on
one occasion noted that “although Armenia’s geography places it
at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Near East,
culturally we Armenians belong to Europe, and it is only naturalEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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that the Republic of Armenia aspires to join the common European
community of nations” (Kirakossian 2004 and 2007: 255).
Having laid out the key factors driving Armenia’s interest in
regional EU engagement, we will discuss the Armenian public's
perceptions of Europe, and differences between the society's
political and social stances.
II. Armenians’ perception of Europe: fears and expectations
Armenia's process of European integration has been driven
primarily by the country's elites, en route to institutional
democratization. The elite’s perceptions of Europe have in turn
been largely politically driven, with Europe viewed as a political
entity from which Armenia can only derive political and economic
benefits. Armenian authorities tend to view reforms in line with
European standards as the means by which to draw the country
closer to Europe politically.
As one indication of the prevalence of this view, the majority of
parties in the country's last parliamentary election in May 2007,
and all parties that ultimately won parliamentary seats, say they
see no alternative to European integration. Opposition and
government parties alike have unequivocally supported the
country's process of integration with Europe.
European Integration as a necessity
According to former Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Vartan
Oskanian, “The ENP will give us the framework within which to
work more closely with the EU member states to foster our
institutions and to upgrade our effectiveness, efficiency and
standards in all social and economic spheres” (Oskanian 2006). AEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Russian-language government supporting newspaper Respublka
Armenii (Republic of Armenia), even noted that the Armenian
government had asked the European Union to monitor the
implementation of the ENP Action Plan once a year, rather than
the more typical once every two years (Golos Armenii 2006).
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan, a former
opposition activist and Member of Parliament, once noted that
“European integration is a necessity on the way to Armenia
building a legitimate state.” In accordance with former Foreign
Affairs Minister Oskanian, Kocharyan also noted that
strengthening democratic development could prove a surer way to
advance Armenia’s relationship with the European Union
(Khachatrian 2006).
Integration as model to resolve conflicts
The desirability of emulating Europe’s political model was
endorsed by Armenian writer Levon Khechoyan, in a series of
articles in the “Literary Newspaper” following his trip to Europe. He
writes of admiring the functioning relationships between
ideologically different political parties and individuals. He contrasts
the fierce struggle of Armenian political parties for power with
European parties, which despite disagreements act as a
unanimous front when there is a threat to their respective states
(Khechoyan 2001).
Khechoyan also paid attention to the European integration of
the Caucasian states, viewing that process as holding potential to
resolve conflicts in the region. A similar opinion has been
expressed by Armen Rustamyan, chairman of the National
Assembly's Standing Committee on International Affairs, whoEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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argues that European influence is likely to play a positive role in
solving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
To date, the European Union per se has not been actively
involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, nor
has it implemented any projects in that region. Nevertheless, from
time to time Armenia's intelligentsia and political representatives
have called on the European Union to take a more active role in
the issue.
Integration as threat to national identity
We could confirm that both the Armenian government and the
Armenian society in general have been expecting positive impacts
by the EU on the country’s development and this trend of
expectation has further increased. With respect to fears, we notice
that elite stances have been rather cautious, seldom identifying
European values or vices which pose a potential danger to
Armenia or Armenian culture. However, other layers of society, in
particular the intelligentsia, have been more straightforwardly
critical.
Armenia is a traditional and ethnically homogenous society.
Some Armenians may view European influences as a threat to
national identity. The values associated with a patriarchal family
structure, heterosexuality and the Armenian language are
considered to be potential victims of further Europeanization
(Matosyan 2008: 110).
Karine Hakobyan, a representative of the Armenian NGO
“Reform”, expressed these views in a TV interview: “We consider
Europe as a model of democracy,” Hakobyan said. “Let us follow
Europe in matters of environmental protection. According to this
perception, by adopting European values, we can distort our ownEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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national identity. Consider European identity: For example, high
level of suicides. Leaving alone the homosexuals – which are not
only a European phenomenon – Europe has serious problems
with family preservation. All this tells us we need a strong system
which allows us to adopt European values and preserve ours”
(ibid.).
European culture as threat to values
The innate problem of this argument lies in the fact that it broadly
views democratization as a threat to national identity, and as
Europe is the source of democratization in Armenia (which is not
always the case, as the United States has been equally consistent
with its support in democracy building in Armenia)––therefore, the
argument continues, the threat to our identity comes from Europe.
But the counter-argument to this perception that identity and
democracy are mutually fostering, that they do not necessarily
need to oppose one another, but support and strengthen each
other, is more persuasive. In fact, “without identity, a democracy
becomes incapable of defending even the values it holds most
dear” (Sharansky 2008: 6, 108)). No one can constrain Armenians
to weaken their devotion to their families, church, community, etc.
unless these are the choice of particular individuals.
Beyond family values, some in Armenian society hold a more
broadly skeptical stance toward contemporary European culture.
The cultural and spiritual “decadence” of Europe is underlined by
many Armenian intellectuals, and can be watched, read and heard
on a daily basis through various media outlets in Armenia. Azat
Yeghiazaryan, director of the Literature and Arts Institute of the
Academy of Sciences of Armenia, has lamented the fact that
Armenians have lost Europe as a spiritual beacon, as Europe is inEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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crisis. “European society after the Renaissance has never been so
devoid of spiritual landmarks as now … an impression was left as
if Europe has run out of the ability of spiritual development”,
Yeghiazaryan wrote in the “Literary Newspaper” (Yeghiazaryan
2002).
Public opinion on Europe
Nevertheless, despite those fears and concerns, surveys imply
that the level of positive feeling in Armenian society toward the
European Union is very high. Between May 2006 and January
2008, the U.S.-based International Republican Institute, along with
Baltic Surveys and the Gallup Organization, implemented eight
surveys with a wide array of questions about political
developments in Armenia. Four questions related to the European
Union as well.
Seven of the eight times that IRI/Gallup conducted these
surveys, the European Union emerged as the most trusted
institution among Armenians, with 82 percent to 87 percent
favorable answers. Respondents also showed strong support for
the prospect of Armenia joining the European Union. In the
surveys, 30 percent to 38 percent of respondents replied that
Armenia should definitely join the European Union, while 42
percent to 51 percent were of the opinion that Armenia should
probably join it in the future.
Similarly, a large percentage of respondents (between 80
percent and 87 percent) replied that the current state of relations
between Armenia and the European Union was good, with the EU
coming either second, after Russia, or third, behind Iran, in this
regard. The surveys’ fourth question asked which country (or
entity) was Armenia’s most important partner. In aggregate,Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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respondents usually rated the European Union as either the third
(after France) or fourth (after Iran) most important partner (all
surveys available at www.iri.org).
Despite the positive attitudes of the Armenian public and the
political elites towards further European integration, there have
been several factors, both of an internal and external nature that
have hindered Armenia’s ability to engage in wider regional
cooperation and deeper European integration. The regional
projects proposed to date have been relatively limited, while—due
to geographic or political reasons—Armenia has played little or no
role in several regional initiatives.
III. Factors impeding further regional cooperation and
integration
A number of bilateral political problems have prevented the Black
Sea region’s countries from engaging collectively in a “bold
regional project”. These ongoing issues include tensions between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the
lack of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey,
Georgian-Russian tensions that culminated in August 2008’s
devastating war, and the recurring issues between Greece and
Turkey. Hence, cooperation in the Black Sea region has mainly
focused on “soft”, non-military activities (Tassinari 2006).
Low pace of democratization impedes regional cooperation
In addition to these external problems, internal problems have led
the European Union to watch democratic developments in the
Black Sea region’s former USSR states with increasing concern.
Elections in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have all beenEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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criticized. The state of democratization in each of these countries,
though on differing levels, has led to calls for greater commitments
and efforts by their respective governments. The recurring political
crises in Ukraine indicate that the Orange revolution was unable to
solve that country’s endemic political problems. Russia’s internal
political dynamics have raised serious concerns among European
observers. Despite reforms, Turkey too is establishing a new
identity, with political struggle between the Islamic government
and the Kemalist opposition still developing.
In the case of Armenia’s internal political developments, the
low pace of the democratization of the society and governance is
impeding the country’s ability to be more courageously involved in
regional projects. While the causes of Armenia’s isolation from
regional energy projects are complex, the successful
democratization of policies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
the de facto independent states is linked to successful conflict
resolution.
Armenia’s state of transformation
For liberal democracy to function, institutions do matter. Elections
are just one part of this story (Ward and Gleditsch 1998: 51–61).
The European Commission (EC) implemented an assessment of
the ENP progress with respect to Armenia, and released its report
in April 2008, focusing largely on the country’s progress in
institutionalization and democratization. The report noted progress
in judiciary reform, administration of elections, the implementation
of an ombudsperson and improvement in the business climate.
However, it added that the February 2008 presidential
elections raised some concerns, and that the pace of reforms hadEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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been slower compared to earlier years (European Commission
2008a).
The Armenian Civil Society Experts (ACSE) sharply criticized
the EC report, calling the evaluation “dangerous” at a time “when
the Armenian government still holds dozens of political prisoners;
when it successfully attacks the few independent media left in
Armenia; when it amends laws to clearly bar demonstrations
without any justification; when it conducted an election that did not
meet the minimum requirements of freedom and fairness; when it
uses the judicial system to deny citizens their rights; and when it
uses the powers of the state to deny basic human and civil rights
to the citizens” (Partnership for Open Society 2007).
Effectiveness of reforms
These experts’ harsh critique disagreed with the election
assessments made by electoral observer missions sent by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But unlike ACSE
assessment which concentrated narrowly on the election and the
post-election situation in Armenia, the EC Report covered the
whole of 2007, focusing particularly on Armenia’s progress in
building institutions. The report made a distinction between the
implementation of the ENP plan and Armenia’s broader political
and economic situation.
In this regard Armenia has made some progress. However, it
remains to be seen how effective these reforms have been, and
how they will ultimately affect citizens’ lives. It is very hard to
assess how effective the decentralization of powers has been, as
anticipated by the constitutional amendments of November 2005.
Judicial independence, freedom of the press, punishment ofEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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corrupt politicians and the ability to engage in independent and
effective legislative activity are areas in which much effort still
needs to be spent.
1 In addition, the effects of Armenia’s post-
election crisis still need to be fully examined and addressed.
Lack of conditionality in ENP
ENP action plans for ENP member countries lack a “conditionality
factor” tied to the progress of the plans. In order for the ENP to be
taken more seriously by the South Caucasus countries, the EU
must make ENP aid to the South Caucasus countries conditional,
tied to the progress of democratization, respect for human rights
and the rule of law.
Following irregularities in Armenia’s February presidential
elections and subsequent post-electoral violence, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
threatened the country with sanctions and suspension of the
country’s voting rights. In PACE resolution 1609, dated from April
17, 2008, the group called on the Armenian government to lift
restrictions on public rallies, to launch an independent inquiry into
the March 1 crackdown on opposition protesters, to set up a
dialogue with opposition parties, and to release individuals
imprisoned “on seemingly artificial and politically motivated
charges” (Abrahamyan 2008).
Armenia was given six months – until January 2009 – to
comply with the resolution’s terms or face possible suspension of
its PACE voting rights. Opposition representatives protested that
1 Armenia ranked 109
th in Transparency International’s recent Corruption
Perceptions Index covering 180 countries. Even though the law enforcement
authorities recently accepted that corruption cases more than doubled in Armenia
between 2007 and 2008 (Lazarian 2009), there was never a case of a top official
being charged.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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six months was a too long period to wait for these requirements to
be fulfilled.
This was one of the rare episodes in which Europe came close
to taking away a South Caucasus PACE member’s voting rights.
Even though the Armenian government did not fully comply with
the PACE resolution of April, in January 2009, “backed down on
its threats to impose sanctions against Armenia on January 27,
2009, citing the Yerevan government's pledge to enact legal
amendments that could result in the release of dozens of
imprisoned opposition members” (Kalantarian 2009).
The process of those legal amendments has been extremely
slow (avoiding the application of the term “political prisoner” as
existing in Armenia, nonetheless the U.S. State Department
Report on Human Rights was much more straightforward in
pointing out the human rights violation cases in Armenia
throughout 2008 (U.S. State Department 2009).
Remaining “inclusion/exclusion dilemma”
It has been often noted that incentives toward reforms are limited
for countries in the ENP, because the action plans lack an
accession perspective. The “inclusion/exclusion dilemma” remains
unresolved (Smith 2005: 758; Zulueta-Fülscher 2008: 3–4). The
prospect of full EU membership for Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, subject to full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria,
must not remain an abstract possibility but rather become a
tangible, even if distant probability. The Eastern Partnership
targets this gap in a nuanced way.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
28 | Armenia’s European Future
The Black Sea Synergy
The related issues of Armenia’s location and identity might
similarly be considered as factors impeding a deeper relationship
with Europe. Armenia is not a Black Sea littoral state. Nor do
Armenians consider themselves to be a Black Sea people.
However, political maps of the Black Sea region and the political
parlance of Black Sea regional projects typically group Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova together as belonging to the
Black Sea region. Between November 2008 until April 2009,
Armenia served as chair of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
organization.
Yet when one studies the main areas of cooperation of the
EU’s Black Sea Synergy initiative, it is hard to ignore the fact that
in several critical areas (energy, transport, maritime security and
environment, and fisheries), Armenia – for natural or for political
reasons – has no participation at all. Indeed, in almost half the
areas covered by the Black Sea Synergy concept, Armenia has no
participation whatsoever (European Commission 2007). However,
the initiative does give “democracy, respect for human rights and
good governance” and “the ‘frozen’ conflicts” a high priority
(respectively being the first and third areas identified for
cooperation, out of 13).
The “Report on the First Year of the Implementation of the
Black Sea Synergy” shows that issues immediately concerning the
littoral states of the Black Sea have been more successful in terms
of implementation and achievement. Moreover, these issues (most
prominently environment, maritime policy and fisheries, energy,
transport being the top four areas) have in practice taken a topEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
Armenia’s European Future | 29
priority, pushing back areas originally deemed of foremost
importance in the initiative.
Alienation from the Black Sea Synergy
According to the report, the issue of “democracy, respect for
human rights and good governance” fell to ninth place in terms of
priority, and the “frozen conflicts” to 10th place of 10 (European
Commission 2008b). Thus, long-term regional strategic issues
such as conflict resolution and democratization gave way to issues
stemming from the geography of the Black Sea region.
Because Armenia is not geographically a Black Sea littoral
country, its policymakers have felt alienated from the Black Sea
Synergy project. Indeed, with the exception of rare conferences on
Black Sea issues, there are no discussions on the Black Sea
Synergy initiative in Armenia.
Even Armenian officials rarely mention the initiative. For
example, in January and October of 2008, the Armenian
International Policy Research Group organized two high-profile
conferences on Black Sea issues (the latter event was in
cooperation with the Harvard Black Sea Security Program and the
Defense Ministry of Armenia).
On each occasion, Armenian officials were invited and made
several presentations, and never once mentioned the term “Black
Sea Synergy.” The speech by the Secretary of National Security
Council of Armenia, for example, did not address the Black Sea
security related issues at all, despite the focus of the
Harvard/AIPRG Black Sea Security Yerevan Workshop.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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External factor impeding regional cooperation
External factors impeding Armenia’s inclusion in regional
programs are related to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and to ongoing Armenian-Turkish
stalemate in relations (which have good chances of normalization
in the short-run). Armenia’s lack of national identification with the
Black Sea or Caspian regions additionally hampers its
participation. A less significant, but nevertheless real set of factors
is the Armenian-Russian alliance and Armenia’s military, political
and economic dependence on Russia.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The first external factor impeding regional integration is the war of
the Nagorno-Karabakh people for self-determination and
independence, and Armenia’s support to the ethnic Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh. This prolonged, as yet unresolved conflict is
the most significant obstacle to peace and stability in the South
Caucasus. Fourteen years after the declaration of a ceasefire, the
parties have failed to take any tangible steps towards a
settlement. Despite the efforts of international mediators, the
conflict continues. The conflict took over 20,000 lives, and today
there is neither war nor peace (International Crisis Group Report
187, 2007).
The potential for this conflict existed throughout the Soviet
period. Yet there have been arguments that the quasi-
democratization of the Soviet Union was instrumental in triggering
a full-fledged war. Although today the conflict is an obstacle to
democratization and regional integration, the solution of the war inEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
Armenia’s European Future | 31
the long run also rests with successful democratization in the
region (Mkrtchyan 2007: 79–92).
The Europeans acknowledge the urgency of this matter. For
example, Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative’s (EUSR) to
the South Caucasus, after addressing the Permanent Council of
the OSCE behind closed doors, said that “without stability, without
a consensus around the rules of the game in terms of democratic
institutions, elections, and so on, there will not be a basis for a
mutually beneficial relationship based on mutual trust and
common values with the EU. (…) Only by having legitimate, strong
governments will it be possible to make the difficult decisions that
will have to be made in overcoming those conflict situations”
(Peuch 2008).
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Because of the conflict, Azerbaijan has acted to exclude Armenia
from a number of important regional projects. These include oil
and gas pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (or South Caucasus) gas pipeline, the Baku-
Supsa oil pipeline and the planned Nabucco gas pipeline. Plans
for construction of a new railway (the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-
Baku) have circumvented Armenia, despite the existing railway
linking Armenia and Turkey (the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railway, which
was absolutely ignored by Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan).
2
2 It is misleading to refer to the Kars-Gyumri railway as a “local line” and that it is in
no way comparable to the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway of “transcontinental
relevance” (for such a view please refer to Vladimir Socor, “Kars-Akhalkalaki-
Tbilisi-Baku Rail Project soon to Roll Forward, January 19, 2007, Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Jamestown Foundation. The railway links Kars to Gyumri, which is then
linked to Tbilisi, which in turn is linked to Baku through another line. During the
Soviet era, these routes were in service. The Gyumri-Tbilisi line was the only line
that continued onwards to Moscow and deep into the other regions of the SovietEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Petroleum revenues helped Azerbaijan boost its military budget
from 175 million US Dollar in 2004 to 1.3 billion US Dollar in 2008,
ostensibly preparing for war against the people of Nagorno-
Karabakh to place them forcibly under Azerbaijani territorial
sovereignty. Armenian officials assert that Baku’s purchase of
powerful weaponry in 2005 and 2006 violated the terms of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) (International
Crisis Group Report 187, 2007).
Consequences of the Georgian-Russian War
The Georgian-Russian war may possibly give the Azerbaijani
leadership pause before any commencement of military campaign,
however. On November 2, 2008 the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan signed the Moscow Declaration, initiated by the
president of the Russian Federation. This was the first time that
presidents of the two nations had put their signature to a common
document on Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although a final settlement of the conflict may seem unlikely in
the short term, it is significant that the presidents committed
themselves to “restore stability and security in the region by
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by political means” (The
Website of the President of the Russian Federation 2008). After
the Russian-Georgian war, the bellicose rhetoric of the Azerbaijani
leadership has incomparably decreased, which is a positive sign
indeed if continued.
Union. This railway line, which was constructed in late 19
th-early 20
th century used
to link two empires, the Ottoman Empire to the Tsarist Russia. Though dormant,
the Kars-Gyumri railway would require some reconstruction to render it serviceable
again to function again but should by no means be looked down as an irrelevant
line in comparison to the non-existent and greatly politically motivated KATB.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Military expenditures in the region
But the immense arms race in the South Caucasus (the Georgian
military budget went up from 60 million US Dollar in 2004 to 769
million US Dollar in 2008, while in response to Azerbaijani buildup
the Armenian military budget grew from 81 million US Dollar in
2004 to 376 million US Dollar in 2008) can only undermine
regional integration, as Armenian-Azeri rivalry and Georgian-
Russian tension remains.
All of those states are part of the Black Sea region, and the
three South Caucasus republics have partnership action plans
with the EU. As one possible brake, the ENP could set a
maximum amount of defense expenditure allowed in the budgets
of the Neighbourhood countries. Conflict prevention measures are
needed to stop the ominous arms race in the South Caucasus.
Democratization of Nagorno-Karabakh
In recent years, there have been suggestions from inside the EU
that it should engage directly with Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto
authorities, helping to jump-start democratization (or support and
further foster the democratization processes which the area has
been experiencing in the last thirteen years) and legal reform
projects (Freizer 2006). The existence of Nagorno-Karabakh could
be internationally regularized, and the de facto government there
brought into the scope of the international system. Nagorno-
Karabakh remains the only entity in the entire South Caucasus
region where the European Union has invested no resources for
economic rehabilitation projects (Mkrtchyan 2007: 91).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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EU Special Representative to become more active
It would be useful for the EUSR to the South Caucasus to become
more active in the conflict resolution process. This might include
observing the Minsk process, supporting direct contacts with all
parties (including Nagorno-Karabakh), traveling to Nagorno-
Karabakh
3, and assessing conflict-related needs. Yet the
European Union has refrained from committing itself to
participating in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution
efforts.Realization of ENP plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan will
be difficult unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is solved
peacefully as soon as possible.
Difficult relations with Turkey
The second external impediment to successful regional
cooperation in the wider Caucasus region is the lack of diplomatic
relations between Armenia and Turkey. As the Nagorno-Karabakh
war proceeded, and as the Karabakhi Armenian forces captured
areas surrounding Karabakh in 1993, Turkey sealed its land
borders with Armenia (the air borders were and are open, with
regular flights between Yerevan and Istanbul), and declined to
establish diplomatic relations with Armenia (although Turkey had
been one of the first nations to recognize the independence of
Armenia in 1991, it had delayed the process of establishment of
official diplomatic relations).
3 Whenever the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus visits the region
and travels to Armenia and Azerbaijan, one of the questions often discussed is
whether the Representative would go to Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite his wish to
visit Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU Special representative had to stand back from
such a step (which might be perceived as recognition of the de facto state by the
EU). In 2007 Peter Semneby changed his route halfway to Stepanakert and made
back for Yerevan.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Armenian governments have often reiterated that they support
the establishment of relations with Turkey without any
preconditions. Armenia’s first president (Levon Ter Petrossian,
1991–1998) lowered the priority placed on the campaign to win
international recognition for the issue of the Armenian genocide,
removing it from the country’s foreign policy agenda. Under his
successor, Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008), the campaign became
a cornerstone of Armenian foreign policy. Nevertheless, this
(recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey) was never
presented as a precondition for establishing relations with Turkey.
Nor have any Armenian presidents argued that Armenia has any
territorial claims toward Turkey, as Turkish officials often used to
cite.
Armenian authorities do not oppose Turkish regional initiatives
or Turkish EU membership. However, Turkey had made the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within a framework of
Azerbaijani “territorial integrity” a necessary precondition for
establishing relations and opening borders with Armenia.
Today, Turkey does not allow transit through its territory for any
goods destined for Armenia. The UN Convention on Transit Trade
of Landlocked States (passed July 8, 1965), which Turkey joined
in 1968, states in article 2 that “Freedom of transit shall be granted
under the terms of this convention for traffic in transit and means
of transport. (…) Consistent with the terms of this convention, no
discrimination shall be exercised which is based on the place of
origin, departure, entry, exit or destination or on any
circumstances relating to the ownership of the goods or the
ownership, place of registration or flag of vessels, land vehicles orEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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other means of transport used.” Turkey violates this convention
vis-à-vis Armenia.
Changing preconditions of Turkey
Turkey’s preconditions towards Armenia have been changing. At
various times, they have included the withdrawal of Armenian
forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azerbaijani
territories, the return of Shushi (a city in Nagorno-Karabakh),
recognition of Turkish and Azerbaijani territorial integrity and
borders, provision of a communication corridor for Azerbaijan and
Turkey via Meghri, reconfirmation of the 1921 treaties of Kars and
Moscow, deletion of references to the Armenian Genocide and
“Western Armenia” from Armenia’s Declaration of Independence,
an end to the international campaign for recognition of the
Armenian Genocide, and the establishment of an historians’
commission to study the genocide (Mkrtchyan 2007a: 16).
Recent approximation
After Serzh Sargsyan became president the relations and talks
between the Turkish and Armenian officials became more
occasional even though Sargsyan had stated that the international
recognition and condemnation of the Armenian genocide would
remain in his foreign political agenda. The Turkish President
Abdullah Gül joined Armenian President Serzh Sarkissian to
watch a match in Yerevan which was the first time a Turkish
President visited Armenia. EU leaders such as Javier Solana and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy welcomed this initiative.
Both before and after that meeting, Armenian and Turkish
diplomats have held secret negotiations. Those meetings and
talks are continuing. Independent of the U.S. debates of theEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Armenian genocide recognition (U.S. President Barak Obama,
Secretary Hillary Clinton, Vice-President Joseph Biden, Speaker
Nancy Pelosi all pledged to recognize the Armenian genocide
once in power), there is much hope in Armenia that the
normalization of relations and opening of borders between
Armenia and Turkey is not in a distance.
Missing role of the EU
The EU has been though less involved in actively pushing for the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey
and the opening of the last closed bolder of the “iron curtain”, the
Turkish-Armenian border. Turkey is a state aspiring to join the EU
in the short term, and Armenia is a EU partner country. Hence, the
European platform could serve as the best arena for normalization
of relations.
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform vs. Caucasus
Stability Pact
In this context, the Turkish-backed “Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform” initiative has little chance of success. It is
partly a reiteration of the similar-sounding Caucasus Stability Pact
proposed by former Turkish president Suleyman Demirel in 2000.
But this earlier idea gained no genuine traction. The Brussels-
based Center for European Policy Studies elaborated its own
concept of a Caucasus Stability Pact that depended on finding
solutions to the region’s “frozen conflicts.” This group identified a
possible resolution in providing functional independence to the
secessionist regions, although still within the sovereignty of the
countries inside of whose borders they had existed in Soviet
times.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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This plan would have lessened the role of Turkey in the region
as well. However, none of the interested parties (Turkey, Russia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) welcomed this conception of
the Stability Pact. The August 2008 proposal (which changed its
name three times in three days, between the “Caucasus Alliance,”
the “Caucasus Stability Forum” and the “Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform” indicating the lack of a well-conceptualized
or thought out approach) has had less clarity, especially regarding
resolution of the existing conflicts, the roles of Russia and Iran, the
roles envisioned for the non-recognized secessionist entities, or
the future of the current Turkish-Armenian stalemate.
The presidents of the region’s nations have welcomed the
initiative, but there has been no widespread public discussion or
debate on the issue. Any successful regional initiative would need
a consensus within the region. There is little ground to believe
such a consensus is possible in the short term unless the issues
of the “secessionist” conflicts are addressed.
The Turkish approach to conflict resolution
Within the Caucasus Stability Platform, Turkey appears likely to
support its own approach to resolving the South Caucasian
conflicts. For example, during one of the above mentioned Black
Sea security Yerevan events, Deniz Cakar, Head of NATO and
Euro-Atlantic Infrastructure and Logistics Department of the
Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry (representing the Stability
Platform) argued that the region’s conflicts should be resolved
based on the principle of state territorial integrity. She also noted
that the Platform would include states of the region.
Thus the contentious issues became clear. First, other
international law principles such as the self-determination ofEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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peoples would be ignored. In addition, de facto states would be
excluded from participation in the platform. This alone could mean
the beginning of the end of the Platform’s practical existence.
Dependence on Russia: economic relations
A third external factor impeding Armenian integration within the
region and beyond is its political and especially economic
overdependence on Russia. Russia accounts for the lion’s share
of investment in Armenia. Telecommunication companies, the
banking system, energy plants and gas suppliers, the metal (foil)
industry, and the railway system all are completely or partially
under Russian control Arka 2008). According to the Russian
Minister of Trade, Russian investments in Armenia total 1.7 billion
US Dollar. Russia is Armenia’s biggest source of imported goods,
accounting for 22.7 percent of the country’s total (2.714 billion US
Dollar) imports in 2007. In addition to trade, hundreds of
thousands of Armenians work in Russia and send remittances to
their relatives living at home.
Indeed, the Armenian Diaspora is quite widespread, but 70
percent of remittances sent to Armenia are from Russia (IMF
2007). According to the Central Bank of Armenia, during the first
half of 2008 cash remittances sent back to Armenia by Armenians
working abroad rose by 57.5 percent, totaling 668.6 million US
Dollar, equivalent to 15 percent of the country's GDP for the first
half of that year. In 2007, cash remittances through bank transfers
rose by 37 percent to a record-high level of 1.32 billion US Dollar
(Danielyan 2008).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Dependence on Russia: military support
Due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, and the
tense Turkish-Armenian relations, Armenia has been dependent
on Russian military support as well. Armenia is a founding
member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
founded in 2002, and currently including members are Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. Like NATO’s Article 5, the CSTO has security
guarantees to its members against external threats. Russia is thus
a security guarantor of Armenia.
When we combine this security dependence with the economic
overdependence, we understand that Armenia has relatively
limited maneuvering room with respect to involvement in regional
initiatives, or to diversifying its economic and political preferences.
IV. Conclusions
Taking into account the factors discussed in this chapter, we can
conclude that Armenia would need to take several steps in order
to prove its commitments to EU cooperation. In the short term,
Armenian authorities would need to meet the PACE 2008
recommendations in lessening the political tension by providing
more transparent trials for the several opposition leaders and
activist and unless found guilty, release them immediately (yet the
2009 May Yerevan municipality elections promise to heighten the
political tension in Armenia) and in general make more genuine
steps in reaching out to the main opposition in the country.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Further reforms
Reforms in various fields should also continue. Despite significant
steps by the current Armenian government in increasing freedom
of the press, much remains to be done in this regard. The fight
against corruption needs to be continued on all possible levels,
including in the administrative bureaucracy, inside law
enforcement, and inside the judiciary and education systems.
Democratization and successful institutionalization would provide
faster growth for the Armenian economy, and improve the political
maturity of the Armenian public, preparing it for further European
integration. Democratization is a key determinant for conflict
resolution as well.
Involvement in regional projects
The Russian-Georgian war showed palpably how vulnerable
Armenia has become in depending on Russia’s economy and
Georgian transit. Iran’s protectionist economy makes that border’s
net benefits very low. Thus, resolving the conflict with Azerbaijan
and establishing relations with Turkey come to the forefront. In this
regard, Armenia should indeed try to be involved in regional
projects as much as possible. Key stakeholders need to be more
inclusive when discussing regional projects. Submission to the
policies of Azerbaijan, which is using energy as a political and
military tool against Armenia, will not lead to positive results.
These are issues which require collective efforts by the region’s
countries, EU nations and the United States alike.
Balance political, economic and strategic choices
In parallel to the above-mentioned efforts, Armenia must diversify
its economic partners and investment climate. The dependency onEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Russia makes Armenia unattractive to other potential investors.
Hence, there is a need to establish balance in the country’s
political, economic and strategic choices. There is little doubt, as
Armenian officials have stated several times, that the country’s
political development has no alternative other than an ultimately
European direction. But for that, Armenia can not afford to lose its
capacities for maneuvering with respect to political, economic and
strategic choices.
More active role of the EU
The EU should take a more active role in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict resolution process. In order to integrate that area into a
broader framework of regional development, the European Union
would need to implement development projects in Nagorno-
Karabakh, as it has in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Consistent
policies regarding unrecognized but de facto governments should
be observed.
Europe should take a positive role in facilitating the
establishment of relations between its two partner states, Turkey
and Armenia. Both countries have deep links to the EU, and the
long political stalemate between Turkey and Armenia must be an
issue of serious concern for Brussels.
Regional Initiatives: Black Sea Synergy and Caucasus
Stability Platform
In projects such as the Black Sea Synergy initiative, issue areas
that do not concern solely the littoral states should be
emphasized. Otherwise there is a danger of estranging non-littoral
states from such regional initiatives. Alternatively, if it proves
difficult to implement common projects including Black Sea littoralEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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and non-littoral states, then ambitious targets in the concept
documents of such initiatives should be avoided, as they will likely
remain unrealized.
Initiatives such as the Caucasus Stability Platform need to be
more openly and publicly presented and discussed. Also, such
initiatives need to take into account the interests of the non-
recognized political entities. Paying exclusive attention to
recognized states, or proposing conflict resolution mechanisms
that selectively focus on specific principles of international law,
while ignoring others, will not make such initiatives successful.
Eastern Partnership
Most importantly Europe needs to preserve and deepen
partnership relations with Armenia, and continue dialogue. In this
regard, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), to be officially launched in
2009 May, would provide a very good platform for EU–Armenia
cooperation. EaP will include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. There is still some
ambiguity with regard to Belarus. It foresees an upgrading of
political engagement, including a new generation of Association
Agreements, far reaching integration into the EU economy, easier
travel to the EU for citizens provided the security requirements are
met, enhanced energy security arrangements benefiting all
concerned, and increased financial assistance.
4
This would be the most comprehensive political-economic-
social program package that the EU had ever concluded with any
of the countries concerned, including Armenia. It most importantly
4 Current ENPI funding for the partners amounts to some 450 million Euro in 2008.
The Commission intends to propose progressively raising this amount to reach
approximately 785 million Euro in the year 2013.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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addresses some of the gaps existing in the ENP, such as the
“conditionality” factor in providing assistance; it is not excluding
future membership provided progress in reforms, regional
integration and human rights records are up to the necessary
level; it is encouraging regional integration (Neighbourhood
Economic Community); it emphasizes the progress of stable
democratic institutionalization; it would be supportive to civil
society dialogue throughout the region; visa facilitation is an
important incentive too for further Europeanization of those
countries (European Commission 2008b).
With its emphases on deeper bilateral and multilateral
cooperation frameworks the EaP would become the most
ambitious EU program implemented in the region. By
demonstrating the “power of soft power” the EU should by no
means attempt any “isolation” of Russia in the region through this
program. Any such attempt would fatally fail the progressive
development of the countries of the region.
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The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear
Tabib Huseynov
I. Introduction
The sudden escalation of the conflict in South Ossetia and the
Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 have demonstrated the
dangers that ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus pose
to European security. For the first time since the end of the Cold
War, Europe is challenged with the emergence of new dividing
lines and what Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called spheres
of “privileged interests” (Kramer 2008). The Georgia crisis has
also increased the risk to alternative corridors of energy transport
reaching Western Europe via the South Caucasus, increasing
concerns over Europe’s energy security.
And last but not least, it has revealed the weaknesses of the
European Union’s internal workings, highlighting the need for
stronger common security and foreign policies. In fact, it would not
be an exaggeration to suggest Europe’s future energy security
and even political unity, contingent upon its ability to stand up for
its values and ideals, is being tested along its easternmost
frontiers, notably in the South Caucasus.
Geographical and mental distances
The challenges and opportunities that emanate from the South
Caucasus, affecting the security and even the political and
economic integrity of Europe, have to date been poorly
understood within the EU's political establishment. This is natural
given that the EU has long viewed the South Caucasus as anEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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obscure and distant periphery. In 2003, when the EU launched its
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the South Caucasus was
not even initially included, reflecting not only the geographical, but
also the mental distance separating the region from EU
policymakers.
The process of eastern enlargement and Georgia’s Rose
Revolution each helped attract EU attention to the South
Caucasus region, however. The European Security Strategy
adopted in December 2003 stressed the need to avoid new
dividing lines in Europe, and in this context, called on the EU to
“take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the
Southern Caucasus” (European Council 2003: 8).
Step by step towards a strategic vision
The EU still lacks a clear strategic vision and coherent policies for
the region, however. While not ruling out the possibility of eventual
EU membership, there is not yet consensus on the Europeanness
of the South Caucasus. However, the EU has progressively
increased its involvement in its eastern neighbourhood, including
the South Caucasus, by establishing new bilateral and multilateral
cooperation frameworks. In fact, as will be discussed below,
despite the justified criticisms of the EU’s passive involvement in
the South Caucasus (Alieva 2006, Lynch 2006), the EU is in the
process of active developing a strategy for its future involvement
in the region.
This can be seen in the Union’s increased engagement with
the South Caucasus within its European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP, 2004), the Black Sea Synergy initiative (BSS, 2007) and the
Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP, 2009). The EU is also seeking
a more active role in the resolution of regional conflicts, as can beEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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seen from its September 2008 decision to send a mission to
Georgia under the auspices of the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP). The success of these initiatives has yet to
be seen, given that they do not yet constitute a coherent policy.
Rather, they represent a product of ongoing reflection on the
nature of EU involvement, and thus serve as building blocks of an
emerging EU vision for the region.
The EU’s increased attention to the South Caucasus also
makes it necessary to critically reassess its policies in the region
and clarify the contours of future engagement.
Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus
Azerbaijan is the biggest country in the South Caucasus in terms
of size, population, and economic potential, as well as EU’s
largest regional trade partner. Azerbaijan’s rich hydrocarbon
reserves and transit potential make it an important element in
European energy policy. Its unresolved conflict with Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh represents a serious security challenge for the
EU, arguably of even greater extent than the one posed by the
August 2008 crisis in Georgia.
Yet, for most EU scholars and policy experts Azerbaijan is also
the least studied country in the South Caucasus. The political
upheavals in Georgia since the 2003 Rose Revolution and that
country’s staunchly pro-Western and pro-European policies have
understandably attracted more European attention, pushing
neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have pursued a
European course with much less fervor, to the periphery of
European attention.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Europe’s approach and Azerbaijan’s role
Nevertheless, the success of any EU strategy relating to the South
Caucasus will inevitably depend on how this strategy addresses
Azerbaijan’s challenges and opportunities. This paper discusses
EU engagement in the South Caucasus, focusing on policies vis-
à-vis Azerbaijan. It analyzes the factors shaping the development
of EU-Azerbaijan relations and the perceptions that impede or
facilitate these developments. Finally, the paper offers a policy-
oriented viewpoint on how EU and Azerbaijan relations could be
developed.
II. Emerging EU vision and policies on the South Caucasus
The inclusion of the South Caucasus states in the ENP in 2004
was a qualitatively new stage in bilateral relations and indicated
the EU’s willingness to engage in deeper relations moving beyond
existing partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA)
frameworks.
1 Thus, in the ENP, the EU offered not only
preferential trade as envisaged by the PCAs, but also the prospect
of “a significant degree of integration, including … a stake in the
EU’s internal market, and the possibility … to participate
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs”
(European Commission 2004: 8).
1 The PCAs were signed with all three countries of the South Caucasus in 1996
and entered into force in 1999. They formed the basis of the bilateral relation of
each of the three countries with the EU, including the areas of political dialogue,
trade, investment, and economic, legislative and cultural cooperation.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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A “ring of friends”
For the EU, the logic behind the ENP was to export its governance
practices and standards to its immediate neighbourhood to the
east and south, thus creating a “friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of
friends’ – with whom EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative
relations” (European Commission 2003: 4).
At the same time, the ENP introductory document and
individual action plans stressed that the ENP process was distinct
from membership. According to the Azerbaijan ENP Country
Strategy Paper 2007–2013, “The objective of the ENP … is to
share the EU’s stability, security and prosperity with neighbouring
countries, including Azerbaijan, in a way that is distinct from EU
membership” (European Union 2006: 4).
No differentiation between East and South
The ENP offered the same opportunities across a wide and rather
diverse neighbourhood, asking in return the same standards of
behavior. Thus, in effect, the ENP has made no differentiation
between its southern neighbours (the Middle East and North
Africa) and countries in its eastern neighbourhood (Eastern
Europe and the Caucasus), which unlike the former category,
have EU membership ambitions. The EU’s eastern partners have
been critical of the EU, and of the ENP as a whole, for failing to
differentiate between eastern and southern regions and have
suspected that the EU was trying to create a “buffer zone” around
itself (for a detailed elaboration of the ENP as a strategy to create
a buffer zone for security, see Marchetti 2006).
In the absence of major incentive for reform, such as the
prospect for actual EU membership, the ENP makes applyingEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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conditionality more problematic with respect to the EU’s eastern
neighbours. However, the ENP has conditioned greater EU
engagement and cooperation, as seen in the progress achieved
by individual partners in meeting agreed targets for reform. The
“Wider Europe” paper states clearly: “Engagement should
therefore be introduced progressively, and be conditional on
meeting agreed targets for reform. New benefits should only be
offered to reflect the progress made by the partner countries in
political and economic reform. In the absence of progress,
partners will not be offered these opportunities” (European
Commission 2003: 16).
In the context of EU relations with its eastern partners, this
effectively implied that they needed to reform before the EU would
seriously consider their membership aspirations.
New policies towards the East: The Black Sea Synergy
The EU soon came to realize the need to strengthen its eastern
ENP by complementing the bilateral format with regional-
multilateral cooperation components. The April 2007 launch of the
new BSS initiative, emphasizing energy, transport, environment,
migration and security issues in the wider Black Sea rim region,
represented the EU’s attempt to complement the ENP
framework’s bilateral cooperation schemes with wider regional
coordination (see European Commission 2007).
The launch of this initiative was a manifestation of the growing
EU interest in, and thus the greater importance being given to the
Black Sea area. This is particularly true considering that Bulgaria
and Romania’s accession in 2007 turned the EU from an outside
player into a Black Sea regional power. The initiative was deemed
to be complementary to existing bilateral cooperation agreementsEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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within the eastern ENP, EU-Russian “Common Spaces” and
membership negotiations with Turkey. In this regard, the Synergy
initiative could also be interpreted as an EU attempt to engage in a
multilateral regional cooperation scheme in the Black Sea region,
which would include Russia.
Key priority: Energy supply diversification
Energy supply diversification was one of the key priorities of the
new initiative. The 2006 Ukraine-Russia gas dispute increased EU
concerns over energy security, as well as its intensifying its desire
to diversify its energy supplies bypassing Russia. The
Commission’s communication outlining the purpose and strategies
of the new initiative mentioned the “trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea
energy corridor” for gas exports from Central Asia to the EU (or
simply put, the Nabucco gas pipeline project) as an important
component of the EU’s energy security strategy (European
Commission 2007: 5).
Black Sea vs. South Caucasus
The introduction of the Black Sea dimension into the discourse on
European integration certainly facilitated increased EU attention to
the region. However, it also had peculiar side-effects, leading to
some attempts, emanating mostly from Georgia, to mentally
deconstruct the South Caucasus as a dominant geographical and
mental concept for referring to the region. Georgia, which viewed
itself as a country with more democracy and closer proximity to
the EU in comparison to Armenia and Azerbaijan, increasingly
viewed its two neighbours as hindrances to its European
aspirations, and was hence unwilling to be put in the same South
Caucasus basket with them.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Thus, in its attempts to draw closer to the EU, Georgia since
2005 has increasingly positioned itself as a Black Sea actor,
perceived by the EU as being more European than the South
Caucasus countries. The August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and
the growing rift between opposition and the Saakashvili
government, however, have visibly damaged Georgian attempts to
position itself closer to the EU by capitalizing on its Black Sea
location.
Azerbaijan – a Caspian actor?
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has little sense of belonging to the
Black Sea region. Guided by its policy of capitalizing on its energy
resources, it prefers to portray itself as a Caspian actor. In EU
political discourse, the Caspian region is perceived to be an
important area from the viewpoint of energy security, but it largely
remains outside EU integration discourse and is perceived as
even less European than the South Caucasus.
These divergent policy discourses within the South Caucasus,
even between two countries as closely and strategically interlinked
as Georgia and Azerbaijan, demonstrate how EU perceptions of
its eastern neighbourhood shape the perceptions and policy
preferences of the regional actors.
Weakness of the Black Sea Synergy
However, the BSS initiative had a major embedded weakness,
which has contributed to its limited success. As a broad regional
initiative, its success was largely dependent on the performance of
another large regional player, Russia, which increasingly chose a
confrontational stance in its dealings with the individual regional
countries (particularly Georgia) and also with the EU, unwilling toEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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reconcile itself to growing EU influence in its neighbourhood, or to
yield its dominant position in the EU’s energy market.
Creation of the Eastern Partnership
The EU’s desire for a regional multilateral cooperation framework
complementary to its eastern ENP, but one which unlike the BSS
would be independent from the Russian presence and would
provide greater reform incentives to aspiring partners, was
perhaps the rationale behind the May 2008 joint Polish-Swedish
proposal on “Eastern Partnership.”
This proposal aimed at increasing regional cooperation on a
narrower and more focused level with Ukraine, Moldova and the
three South Caucasus states. The proposal called for serious
review of the countries’ existing cooperation documents with the
EU, a “new generation of action plans,” and the use of more
vigorous benchmarks and criteria in the EU accession process. In
concrete terms, the proposal called for visa-free movement, a free
trade zone and enhanced person-to-person contacts.
The European Commission initially treated the proposal with
caution, because it suggested drastic revisions in the ENP,
primarily suggesting the application of stricter monitoring
mechanisms, along with clearly differentiating between the
southern and eastern regions, by focusing on EU integration
prospects for the latter. After initial rejection in May, the proposal
was approved by the Commission in June 2008 after some
internal EU trade-offs.
With or without membership perspective?
In terms of EU integration prospects, the original proposal spoke
generally about “promoting the EU integration process” amongEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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eastern partners, although on a declarative level Poland strongly
presented the proposal as an offer which could lead to EU
membership in the long run. As Polish foreign minister Radosław
Sikorski said, “We all know the EU had enlargement fatigue. We
have to use this time to prepare as much as possible so that when
the fatigue passes, membership becomes something natural”
(Goldirova 2008).
Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: duplication of
efforts?
Interestingly, the EaP has shown that the alleged division of
Europe between “old” and “new” is rather artificial, as the proposal
has received support and critical remarks from both eastern and
western EU member states. Thus, while co-authored by Sweden
and endorsed by the UK, the proposal was also criticized by
Bulgaria and Romania, due to their fears that the BSS, in which
they have played a more visible role, would be undermined.
European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-
Waldner also warned of duplicating EU efforts (Safarikova 2008).
Indeed, the proposal says it is complementary to the Black Sea
initiative, but even for EU bureaucrats it remains unclear how the
EU will avoid duplication of effort by simultaneously engaging in
both initiatives. As Gunnar Wiegand, the European Commission’s
director for Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia,
said, “There will have to be a choice whether one wants to
establish a good form of this multilateral process or whether one
wants to use existing mechanisms [such as the Black Sea
Synergy] where also other players [most notably, Russia] continue
to have a role” (Pop 2008a).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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The Georgian-Russian war and the Eastern Partnership
The Georgia-Russia crisis of August 2008 has given a new
momentum to the EaP proposal. The emergency EU Council
meeting in September 2008 in Brussels resolved to speed up the
approval process, with the Council planning to adopt the proposal
in March 2009 (see European Council 2008). However, by March
2009, when EU Council convened in Brussels to adopt a final
decision on the EaP, many EU members, particularly France and
Germany, were not ready to support a clear promise for potential
full membership, as advocated by Poland, Sweden and the Baltic
states.
This reluctance largely dictated by a desire not to antagonize
Russia and by precarious domestic situation in many eastern
partner countries (such as the growing standoff between
opposition and the government in Georgia and Moldova in March–
April 2009, ongoing conflict between pro-Russian opposition and
pro-Western government in Ukraine and the controversial March
2009 referendum in Azerbaijan which scrapped presidential term
limits). As a result, the European Council declaration on EaP
adopted on March 20, 2009 merely stated the partnership holds
out the promise of “political association and further economic
integration between the European Union and its eastern
members”, falling short of unambiguous recognition of the eastern
partners’ European identity and prospect of a membership in the
future (European Council, 2009).
Nothing new?
Now, the EU formally launched the EaP at a summit on May 7,
2009. It appears that the EU is going to give higher priority toEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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multilateral cooperation with eastern partners aspiring to full
membership, while once again keeping clearly stated membership
prospect open to future deliberations. There have been some
critical remarks against the initiative, that it offers nothing new.
Thus, Marie-Anne Isler Beguin, the head of the European
Parliament’s delegation to the South Caucasus, said she had an
impression that the new proposal was “an attempt to camouflage
the weakness of the Neighbourhood Policy” (Lobjakas 2009).
Indeed, the EaP, which turned out to be less ambitious than
initially expected, runs the risk being reduced to a duplicate of its
predecessor initiatives. The August crisis in Georgia, which forced
the EU to be more considerate of the Russian position on many
issues, including enlargement; the precarious domestic situations
in many eastern partner countries; and last but not least, the
global financial crisis, which restricts EU actions and forces
member-states to adopt more self-centered policies, all join
together to create a rather unfavorable environment for meeting
the somewhat exaggerated expectations of the eastern
partnership countries.
But nonetheless, the EaP, by focusing on concrete project-
oriented tasks to reach a free trade and visa-free regime,
represents a new major move forward for the EU in elaborating its
vision and policy with respect to its eastern neighbours. The future
development of this cooperation will largely depend on the quality
and effectiveness of the reforms carried out by EU’s eastern
partners.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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III. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy and Perceptions of the EU
Since its independence, Azerbaijan has aspired to greater
cooperation with the European Community and the EU, and more
broadly with the West. This policy has been aimed at promoting
the country’s independence, security and development, and was
also driven by a desire to offset Russian influence in the region in
the early and mid-1990s. However, as the ruling elite accumulated
large financial resources, consolidated its power domestically and
managed to diversify its foreign policy options, it has over time
reduced its pro-Western discourse and level of ambition for
European integration.
Euro-Atlantic Integration and territorial integrity
The Azerbaijani National Security Concept declares “integration
with European and Euro-Atlantic structures” to be the country’s
second most important policy priority, after restoration of territorial
integrity. However, in practice Azerbaijan pursues a “balanced
foreign policy,” being less ambitious and proactive in pursuing a
Euro-Atlantic agenda and carefully avoiding antagonizing Russia.
Many in Azerbaijan argue that the country’s “balanced foreign
policy” is dictated by its geography and the security challenges it
faces. The ongoing conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh
dominates Azerbaijan’s foreign policy agenda. Azerbaijan also
finds itself sandwiched between Russia, with its growing
aspirations to dominate its near neighbourhood, and Iran, which
seeks to export its Islamic state model.
Russia, the difficult neighbour
Russia in particular wields important political and economic levers
over Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani population and politicalEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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leadership fear that a deterioration of bilateral relations would
result in Russia’s introduction of a visa regime for over a million
Azeris living and working on a temporary or permanent basis in
Russia. This scenario, which Russia has already exercised with
respect to Georgia since 2006 as a punishment for that country’s
pro-Western policies, would lead to inflow of a large number of
young unemployed people, and would thus create grounds for
social and political unrest in the country.
Azerbaijan also fears that deteriorations of relations with
Russia could further lead to increased Russian support for
Armenia on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Many in Azerbaijan
view the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a major tool for influencing
Azerbaijan.
A ”balanced foreign policy”
Thus, the rationale behind Azerbaijan’s “balanced foreign policy” is
the preservation of state stability. Another argument used for
justifying this policy is that by playing on the interests of competing
external powers, notably Russia and the West, official Baku can
maximize its bargaining power with respect to resolution of its
conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and restoration of
country’s territorial integrity.
Because Azerbaijan faces hard security challenges, its official
policy is more considerate of actors which can provide or deny
hard security. As a result, Russia and the United States are
viewed as the dominant competing players in the region, and the
EU is regarded only a secondary actor, which cannot
independently act as a provider or guarantor of security in the
region.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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The Georgia-Russia war has reinforced these perceptions in
Azerbaijan by convincing it that the EU is ill-prepared to deal with
a major crisis in this eastern neighbourhood. Thus, speaking in
October 2008, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov
said, “The EU is a powerful economic and political union of states,
but in terms of acting in a united way, the EU is not there yet,
especially in an environment that changes rapidly. The EU is not
able to act in an instrumental way” (Pop 2008b). The confusion
within the EU over how to respond to the Russian intervention in
Georgia, particularly during the initial period, should come as no
surprise given that, as discussed above, the EU is still in the
process of formulating its strategic vision for the South Caucasus.
A powerful center of gravity: the EU
Yet despite its weak standing in the region, the EU is the most
powerful ideological and economic center of gravity for Azerbaijan.
Comparative opinion polls conducted in 2005, 2006 and 2008 by a
local firm, with financial support by Germany’s Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, have consistently found that the largest share of the
Azerbaijani public prefers closer integration with the EU over any
other foreign policy course. Thus, for example, the results of the
poll published in February 2008 showed 37 percent of
respondents supporting closer integration with the EU, 27.2
percent opting for a policy of “cooperation with all and remain[ing]
neutral”, followed by 16.7 percent preferring integration within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and only 7.7 percent
and 6.9 percent respectively for integration with NATO or the
Organization of The Islamic Conference (see Puls-R 2008).
Although supported by a relative majority, there is considerable
public ignorance in Azerbaijan with respect to the EU, itsEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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institutions and policies. It is not rare for an average person to
confuse the EU with the Council of Europe, or the latter with the
European Council. But this ignorance also represents an untapped
opportunity for the EU. Unlike Russia and the United States, which
are largely perceived in more controversial terms as being
expansionist powers seeking to dominate others, the EU is
perceived as a soft power that seeks to advance its interests by
incentives rather than by pressure.
The structure of the aforementioned poll question, forcing the
respondents to choose between EU and NATO, also gives
important insights into the greater degree of trust that Azerbaijani
society gives to soft power as opposed to hard power players.
There is a flip side to this perception of Europe, as well. Together
with its positive aspects, the EU is also often perceived as too
weak and not really independent in its actions. So, in a way, the
shaping of these perceptions, and hence Azerbaijani preferences
vis-à-vis the EU, will largely depend on the further development of
EU-Azerbaijan relations and the success of EU policies in the
wider region.
IV. The policy focus of EU-Azerbaijan relations
EU-Azerbaijan relations focus mainly on three policy fields, which
influence the formulation of the EU’s emerging vision for the whole
South Caucasus region. These include cooperation on energy
issues, the promotion of democracy and conflict resolution.
Understanding EU and Azerbaijani policies in these three areas is
a key to understanding the general dynamics in their relationships.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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a) Energy cooperation
Azerbaijan’s rich hydrocarbon reserves and transit potential are
the two major assets underscoring the country’s importance for
external powers, including the EU. Since European markets
represent the most profitable option for the export of Azerbaijani
oil and gas, Azerbaijan is naturally interested in securing
unimpeded access for its energy exports to those markets.
Growing European desire to diversify its energy sources and
supply routes has increased Azerbaijan’s importance for the EU.
Strategic link between Europe and Central Asia
Overlapping energy interests have allowed Azerbaijan to position
itself as an important country for Europe’s energy security, serving
as a strategic link between Europe and Central Asia. The EU-
Azerbaijan energy memorandum, signed in November 2006, in
parallel to the adoption of an action plan, declared Azerbaijan to
be a “strategic partner” for the EU in the field of energy
cooperation (see European Commission 2008a). The
memorandum aims at increasing the security of energy supply to
Europe, and at integrating Azerbaijan into Europe’s internal
energy market.
Besides pure economic benefit, this energy-related cooperation
with the EU also has an important political dimension in
Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani public and elites view the existing
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines as
means for firmly attaching Azerbaijan to the political and economic
map of Europe. During the first Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic Energy
Summit, held in Poland in May 2007, Azerbaijan also agreed with
Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland to work jointly on the
extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to Gdansk in Poland,Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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which is viewed as yet another project aimed at reducing
European dependence on Russian oil. As Svante Cornell writes,
the energy-related cooperation between EU and Azerbaijan
increases their interdependence and “gives Europe an important
stake in the security, stability and development of the South
Caucasus as a whole” (Cornell 2006: 91).
Nabucco and South Stream
The Georgia crisis, and a recent Ukrainian-Russian gas row in
January 2009 which caused severe shortages in some eastern EU
members have both underlined the importance of the EU reducing
its dependence on Russian energy supplies, which Russia has
skillfully used to exert pressure on the EU and divide it from within
on important foreign policy issues. In this regard, these
developments have increased the importance of the planned
Nabucco gas pipeline, a major EU initiative designed to reduce its
heavy dependence on Russia for gas supplies. If realized, the
Nabucco pipeline will annually bring 30 billion cubic meters of
Caspian gas to the EU via Turkey, bypassing Russia. Azerbaijan
is uniquely positioned in the Nabucco project, because in addition
to being a potential supplier, it also holds the only viable transit
route between Central Asia, the key supplier for the planned
pipeline, and Europe.
But paradoxically, although Nabucco is more important than
ever for the EU, its chances seem even more remote after the
Georgian crisis. Since its inception in 2006, the Nabucco project
has faced difficulties, mainly because of the undefined
commitment of Central Asian gas suppliers and disagreements
within the EU itself regarding investment and tariffs. Russia has
also systematically tried to undermine the project’s prospects byEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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initiating the competing South Stream pipeline, stretching from
Russia’s Black Sea coast to Italy. The South Stream pipeline
project was approved by the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and
Italian oil giant ENI in June 2007, and is projected to start in 2012
and end in 2013.
Russia is also pressuring Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, two
major potential Nabucco suppliers, to agree to the so-called
Prikaspiysky gas pipeline up along the Caspian shore to Russia.
This has effectively killed prospects for the trans-Caspian pipeline
which would link Central Asian gas with Azerbaijan and further
with the European pipeline network. Russia and Iran also oppose
the idea of a trans-Caspian pipeline, which is a vital element of the
Nabucco project, citing unresolved status of the Caspian Sea.
Consequences of the Georgian-Russian war
The war in Georgia has further complicated Nabucco’s prospects.
The crisis has aggravated the investment climate in Georgia, a
major transit country for the planned project. But most importantly,
by punishing Georgia for its independent pro-Western policies,
Russia has also intimidated Azerbaijan and the potential Central
Asian gas suppliers, dealing a heavy blow to the Nabucco project.
Speaking in September 2008, Azerbaijan’s Energy Minister Natig
Aliyev openly questioned the feasibility of the Nabucco project for
the first time among Azerbaijani officials, referring to it as an “over-
politicized” project. He admitted that without Central Asian
suppliers, Azerbaijan will not be able to independently sustain gas
flow in the pipeline (see Aliyev 2008).
In effect, the Nabucco project finds itself in a vicious circle: EU,
which is interested in the project does not want to invest in the
construction of the expensive pipeline before it receives credibleEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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commitments from the suppliers, particularly, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, and the latter group is similarly reluctant to commit to
supplying the pipeline before there is substantial political will and
financial investment to start the project. From this perspective, the
recent March 2009 decision by the EU to allocate 200 million Euro
for a risk-sharing facility for Nabucco will not produce a tangible
outcome, given the total cost of the pipeline is estimated to be
around some 8 billion Euro. Global financial crisis further hinders
the realization of Nabucco by raising risks associated with this
expensive and politically complicated project.
Sellout of Azerbaijan’s gas?
Russia, meanwhile, has used the European indecisiveness over
Nabucco to convince Azerbaijan to sell its gas, as part of its
general strategy of keeping its monopolist position in the
European gas market. Russian gas monopolist Gazprom has
offered Azerbaijan to buy the “maximum volume” of gas from its
largest Shahdeniz gas field, which is expected to produce some
10-12 billion bcm of gas by 2013–2014 and is viewed as an
important first supply source for the planned Nabucco pipeline.
Left in uncertainty over Nabucco’s prospects, Azerbaijan signed a
memorandum of understanding with Russia on March 27, 2009
about sales of unspecified volumes of gas that leaves the doors
open for selling to Russia the bulk of the Azerbaijani gas that the
EU is counting on to at least partially fill the planned Nabucco
pipeline.
Despite difficulties, Azerbaijani support for Nabucco has not
waned. Speaking at the EU special conference on Nabucco held
in Budapest in January 2009, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev
voiced his country’s strong support for the project. According toEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Aliyev, “The countries of Nabucco and the organizations which
support this project, I think, must act more courageously. They
should not look at the project only as a profit resource. It’s a
matter of energy security. Energy security leads to general
security, to independence in the long run” (Synovitz 2009).
A changed geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape
Overall, the geopolitical and geoeconomic cost of the Georgia
crisis and its aftermath to Azerbaijan and its energy cooperation
with the EU is hard to overestimate. The crisis diminished the
prospects for the Nabucco pipeline, allowing Russia to tighten its
grip on the European energy market, and seriously impaired
further development of the east-west energy and transport
corridor. It has certainly dented Azerbaijan’s chances to elevate its
importance to the EU by becoming not only an energy exporter,
but also a transit hub for export of Central Asian oil and gas to
Europe.
And, last but not least, the crisis also risks weakening regional
cooperation within the BSS by stripping it of an important energy
component. Thus, one of the driving forces behind the BSS
initiative is energy cooperation and the development of “a new
trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea energy corridor” (European
Commission 2007: 5).
b) Promoting democracy, good governance and respect for
human rights
While energy has been the most dynamic and successful area of
EU-Azerbaijan cooperation, Azerbaijan’s poor democratic and
human rights records have been a major impediment in elevating
bilateral relations with the EU to a new strategic level. The
country’s action plan contained an extensive list of policy reformsEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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aimed at improving the democracy and human rights situations in
the country. It called for improving electoral laws and processes,
launching institutional reforms to introduce proper checks and
balances by limiting excessive executive power and improving the
judiciary, and for respecting freedom of the press and freedom of
assembly.
Tacit application of conditionality
The action plan contains important insights into the tacit
connection made by the EU between democratization and
recognition of a long-term European prospect for Azerbaijan, and
indeed for all South Caucasus nations. Thus, Azerbaijan’s ENP
action plan read, “The level of ambition of the relationship will
depend on the degree of Azerbaijan’s commitment to common
values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed
priorities.” In this context, it adds, “[ENP implementation] will
encourage and support Azerbaijan’s objective of further integration
into European structures. The EU takes note of Azerbaijan’s
expressed European aspirations.”
A similar language was used for the Armenia and Georgia
action plans. In effect, this language implies that the EU has tacitly
applied conditionality not only to the degree of its cooperation with
these regional states, but also to the recognition of future
European prospects for the South Caucasus nations.
Limited progress but changed rhetoric
The ENP progress report on Azerbaijan released in April 2008
explicitly said, “There has been limited tangible progress towards
meeting the action plan objectives in the area of democratic
governance” (European Commission 2008b). The EU has limitedEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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potential either to pressure or induce Azerbaijan to fulfill
commitments to serious political and economic reform.
Azerbaijan’s huge profits from oil and gas exports have increased
the government’s self-confidence and perceived self-sufficiency,
and thus diminished pressure for reform. Correspondingly, the
official rhetoric regarding European integration has shifted in
accent. Official Baku has increasingly suggested that it will not beg
for favors from the EU, and that the EU needs Azerbaijan as much
as Azerbaijan needs the EU.
2
The cooperation frameworks existing between the EU and
Azerbaijan are inherently weak, and offer little help. The activities
listed under the ENP action plan concerning promotion of
democracy and human rights contain only general statements,
and lack efficient monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The
BSS initiative focuses on a regional dimension of democracy
promotion by envisaging training and exchange programs, and by
stimulating a regional dialogue with civil society. As such, it does
not focus on domestic developments. While Azerbaijani leadership
values its formal participation in EU programs as part of its general
approach of keeping foreign policy options open, it is not
interested in taking on additional strict and deadline-driven
obligations.
In fact, the EU possesses practically no policy sticks, and only
a few carrots able to influence Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani leadership
has repeatedly stated that it does not need EU’s cheap credits, as
2 For example, in an interview with Russian “Echo Moskvi” radio on December 22,
2006 Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev said, “For us, a partnership program [with
the EU] is not an attempt to ask for something and cry for help. Maybe they [the
EU] will need us more than we will need them.” Full text of the interview in Russian:
www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/48358/.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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it has enough money of its own.
3 In fact, as was discussed above,
Azerbaijan finds itself more vulnerable to Russia’s political and
economic levers than to those of the EU.
Expectations of the civil society
However, the EU has something that Russia lacks – an image of
democratic and prosperous non-imperial power. As such,
Azerbaijani civil society expectations from cooperation with the EU
are much higher. This cooperation is viewed as a means for
promoting democracy, good governance and economic prosperity,
and for eventually becoming a full-fledged member of the
European family.
This democratic tradition and strategic orientation to Europe is
deeply ingrained in the Azerbaijani national identity. Azerbaijanis
pride themselves on being the first Muslim nation in the world to
have established a secular democratic republic, which briefly
existed from 1918 to 1920 before falling to Soviet invasion. This
self-image serves as a key factor in the nation’s adherence to the
European model of democratic governance.
Hence, European integration and the associated liberal values
remain an important part of the domestic political discourse.
Azerbaijanis’ strategic orientation to Europe represents the most
important and perhaps the only significant source of influence that
the EU possesses over Azerbaijan.
3 For example, in July 2008, President Ilham Aliyev, in speaking to Azerbaijan’s
foreign ambassadors meeting in Baku said, “New EU members receive billions of
dollars of aid. We don’t need it. That is why we conduct an independent political
course both domestically and externally, including energy diplomacy.” A.
Rashidoglu, “Baku does care about the West?” [in Russian], Zerkalo newspaper,
July 9, 2008.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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c) The EU’s missing role in resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict
As part of the ENP and the BSS initiative, the EU has pledged
greater political involvement in ongoing efforts to solve the
regional conflicts peacefully. The Communication from the
Commission on ENP Strategy Paper said, “ENP should reinforce
the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional
conflicts,” (European Commission 2004: 6). In its Communication
on the BSS initiative, the Commission called for “a more active EU
role through increased political involvement in ongoing efforts to
address conflicts” (European Commission 2007: 4) According to
the European Commission, “If the ENP cannot contribute to
addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its
key purposes” (European Commission 2006: 9).
However, despite these stated goals, the EU has largely
remained a secondary player in conflict resolution efforts in its
eastern neighbourhood. In the context of the South Caucasus, as
Dov Lynch put it, the EU has “retained a low overall profile, with
little presence in the negotiating mechanisms, no direct
involvement in mediation and an undefined strategy to lead policy”
(Lynch 2006: 61).
While the EU has engaged in some ground-level rehabilitation
and confidence-building programs in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
following the launch of the ENP, and has significantly increased its
involvement in Georgia by deploying an ESDP mission in
September 2008, it has played virtually no direct role in
addressing the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh (see also International Crisis Group 2006). Absence of a
consensus strategy for involvement has largely pushed the EU toEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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the periphery of regional and international efforts aimed at
resolving the Karabakh conflict.
The nature of the conflict
Nagorno-Karabakh is the longest running and most intractable
conflict in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. It is the only conflict in
the South Caucasus which involves two states of the region,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and hence, is the biggest obstacle to
region-wide cooperation and integration initiatives, effectively
excluding Armenia from any projects involving Azerbaijan.
The EU’s inability to contribute effectively to the Karabakh
conflict resolution emanates from the nature of the conflict itself.
As aptly put by Nicu Popescu,
“Unlike the intra-state conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was in many ways an inter-state
conflict between two recognized states – Armenia and Azerbaijan
– with their own partnerships with the EU. This created greater
pressure for neutrality on the EU. Thus, any understanding of EU
policy on Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be taken out of the context of
EU relations not only with Azerbaijan, but also with Armenia”
(Popescu, in print).
Ambiguity of the EU’s approach
The limits of the EU’s ability to engage effectively in the Karabakh
conflict resolution process were revealed yet again during the
negotiation stage of the Azerbaijani and Armenian action plans.
The EU struggled to accommodate the two countries’ competing
efforts to include formulations reflecting their preferences in
dealing with the conflict in their respective action plans. The result
was adherence to the lowest common denominator, whereby the
EU formally announced support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrityEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
The EU and Azerbaijan | 75
in its action plan’s preamble, while also including a reference to
self-determination in the text of Armenia’s action plan concerning
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
4
At the insistence of Azerbaijan, its ENP action plan listed the
EU’s contribution to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict as a first priority. But this move was more about political
symbolism than about actual plans for activity by either Azerbaijan
or the EU. In terms of concrete policy actions, the action plan
contained mostly general proclamations, calling for increasing EU
diplomatic efforts, providing support to the so called Minsk Group
mediation, assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
encouraging people-to-people contacts.
Policy of disengagement
Confronted with competing claims, and unwilling to turn its
partnership documents with Armenia and Azerbaijan into a
battlefield in a war of words, the EU has effectively adopted a
policy of disengagement from the Karabakh conflict. The
frequently used argument that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is
being dealt with by the Minsk Group (steered by the OSCE) has
turned into a convenient excuse for the EU not to assume a more
active role in the conflict resolution process.
The EU has occasionally tried to embark on some confidence-
building projects in Nagorno-Karabakh, and between Armenian
and Azerbaijani communities, in line with the ENP action plans’
stated goals. But its failure to adopt an unambiguous position
4 The Azerbaijani action plan’s text concerning the Karabakh conflict also contained
reference to “the relevant UN Security Council resolutions”, which were adopted in
1993 and called for withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan’s occupied
territories.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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regarding support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, similar to the
positions it has adopted with regard to conflicts in Georgia and
Moldova, has increased Azerbaijan’s opposition to any ground-
level projects in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan’s insecurities
Azerbaijanis fear that in the absence of strong EU commitment for
their territorial integrity, EU involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh
projects could actually serve to legitimize and further entrench the
secessionist authorities there.
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, supported by most EU
member states, further increased Azerbaijan’s fear that forcefully
changing the borders of a nation without its consent could be used
as a precedent for its own conflict in the future. Most importantly,
the Kosovo developments increased Azerbaijan’s reluctance to
allow any foreign peacekeeping troops tasked with separating
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on its soil, without clear
guarantees that those troops would not contribute to the
legitimization of forceful secession by a part of its territory. This
vigilance has extended even to EU troops.
The EU has done little to address Azerbaijan’s underlying
insecurities. In formal communications, the EU always stated that
it recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but it has also sent
mixed signals to Azerbaijanis regarding the EU’s real position on
the issue. For example, a recent statement from EU
Commissioner for External Affairs Benita Ferrero-Waldner was
indicative of EU’s neglectful attitude towards Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. Addressing the European Parliament on September 1,
2008, the commissioner said that following the recent crisis in
Georgia, “such partners as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova canEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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count on our [EU] support in maintaining their territorial integrity
and sovereignty” (Zik.com.ua 2008). Ferrero-Waldner’s statement
caused a wave of criticism in Azerbaijan for omitting it from this list
of countries (see for example Manafli and Abasov 2008).
Thus, the EU’s neutral position and ambivalent support for
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has increasingly been perceived in
Azerbaijan as the absence of any position at all, or in the worst
instances, as a tacitly pro-Armenian position. In both cases, the
EU’s inability to develop a clear position or assessment of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has undermined its credibility and
served to further entrench Azerbaijani suspicions of potential EU
double standards.
The EU Special Representative’s role
Azerbaijan’s insecurity over its territorial integrity has also
impeded the EU Special Representative’s (EUSR) efforts to
assume a more visible and active role in contributing to the
peaceful solution of the conflict, in line with his mandate. For
example, in June 2007, EUSR to the South Caucasus Peter
Semneby had to change his route halfway to Nagorno-Karabakh,
and return to Yerevan, after receiving a phone call from the
Azerbaijani foreign ministry warning him to refrain from his trip.
The Azerbaijani side objected to Semneby’s travel, saying he
could make such a trip only from Azerbaijan and only with the
permission of the Azerbaijani authorities. The EUSR has not
attempted to visit Azerbaijan’s occupied territories since that time.
Paradoxically, the EU itself has served as a peculiar role model
for Azerbaijan in opposing any external contacts with secessionist
authorities. In July 2005, following Azerbaijan’s controversial
decision to establish commercial air links with Northern Cyprus,Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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the divided island’s internationally recognized government
retaliated by freezing Baku’s participation in the ENP. Since the
EU adopted a regional approach, it temporarily halted negotiations
with Georgia and Armenia as well, and threatened Azerbaijan with
exclusion from the ENP if it didn’t abandon its policy of
engagement with Northern Cyprus. The EU resumed talks only
after Azerbaijan gave guarantees to Cyprus that it would in the
future refrain from any such flights without the EU’s permission.
However, the incident also contrasted with the EU’s own
argument on the need to engage with separatist authorities in
Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere in the South Caucasus, and
served official Baku as a handy precedent to argue against any
EU ground-level involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh without official
Baku’s consent.
A self-defeating strategy
Lacking a strategy for involvement, the EU has effectively adopted
a “wait-and-see” approach to the Karabakh conflict. As the EU’s
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Azerbaijan emphasized:
“The EU/EC … aims at stabilising the whole Southern Caucasus
region by supporting the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan … If the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled within the timeframe of the
present CSP, the EC will provide further specific assistance to help
consolidate the settlement, including the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of conflict areas, the return to conflict areas of
Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees and the elimination of the
excessive accumulation of conventional weapons” (European
Union 2006: 5).
This is a self-defeating strategy: While the EU recognizes that a
solution to the Karabakh conflict is the key to the stabilization ofEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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the whole South Caucasus region, it tacitly admits it is not
prepared to assume a more active role in Karabakh peace
process unless a political agreement is reached. This statement
once again demonstrates the contradiction, and even confusion,
which characterizes the EU approach to the Karabakh conflict.
The EU’s indecisiveness when dealing with the Karabakh conflict
undermines its efforts to promote bilateral interests in other areas
of cooperation, in particular policies aimed at promoting
democracy and regional cooperation.
The EU and the Minsk Group
While Azerbaijan opposed the EU’s ground-level projects in
Nagorno-Karabakh, it actually favored, until recently, greater EU
involvement in the mediation process. Unlike Armenia, which was
careful to preserve the Minsk Group format intact, Azerbaijan often
expressed its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in that
Group’s work and even accused it of “monopolizing” the mediation
process (Azer-Press 2008).
In this context, Azerbaijan viewed the EU as an important
player with the potential to reinvigorate the inefficient Minsk Group
format.
5 Privately, Azerbaijani diplomats have generally spoken
positively of the idea of giving the EU observer status in the Minsk
Group, or even of replacing France with the EU as one of the
Group’s chairs. This idea has been supported by a number of
5 Thus, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in 2004 immediately after
Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the ENP, “Of course, the Minsk Group of the OSCE has a
mandate to deal with [the Karabakh conflict] and of course we are not trying to
change that mandate. But at the same time, Azerbaijan is strongly convinced that
broader international attention, the attention of European structures, and of public
opinion in Europe will help find a quick and peaceful resolution to the conflict.” See
Lobjakas 2004.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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influential Western organizations and individual scholars (see for
example International Crisis Group 2007, Cornell and Starr 2006).
However, the Georgia crisis has undermined the EU’s
credibility as a potential key player in solving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The fact that EU civilian monitors in Georgia
were allowed only into “buffer zones” near South Ossetia, but not
into the conflict zone itself, is seen in Azerbaijan as symptomatic
of the EU’s strategic weakness, and as a move which serves to
consolidate the separatist authorities. Proceeding from these
considerations, official Baku expressly rejected EU participation in
the Minsk Group forum, saying the Union cannot act quickly and in
a united way in crisis situations (see Pop 2008a).
V. EU and Azerbaijan: Finding a way forward
Speaking at a conference in Brussels in October 2008, Azerbaijani
Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov announced that Azerbaijan
was not aiming, like Ukraine or Georgia, to become an EU
member, but is more interested in “common areas for trade,
economy, [and] transport … as far as is procedurally possible
without entering the membership discussion” (Pop 2008b).
The limits of EU soft-power
While not excluding the possibility that Azerbaijan could seek EU
membership at some time in the future, this statement is
illustrative of the limits of EU soft-power influence on present-day
Azerbaijan. It makes the EU’s most important policy instrument,
the prospect of membership, largely irrelevant in its dealings with
Azerbaijan. As discussed above, this position stems fromEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Azerbaijan’s reluctance to undertake stricter reform obligations
with respect to the EU, but also from the looming insecurities
concerning its unresolved conflict and Russia’s regional role.
However, the statement also shows that official Baku has adopted
a more realistic and evolutionary approach to development of its
EU relations, which are devoid of overly high expectations.
Today, the Azerbaijani government is interested in developing
a horizontal relationship with the EU, focusing primarily on
economic cooperation and concrete result-oriented projects. In
this regard, the EU has some significant policy “carrots” it could
use to promote bilateral relations, while simultaneously applying
conditionality to contribute to reforms in Azerbaijan.
Free Trade
Developing a free trade agreement between Azerbaijan and the
EU is one such effective policy carrot, which fits the interests both
of official Baku and Brussels. However, this agreement would be
realizable only after Azerbaijan’s accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). This will require significant policy reforms on
the part of Azerbaijan. Currently, the remaining impediments to
Azerbaijan’s WTO accession are high customs tariffs, lack of
transparency, corruption, and failure to enforce commercial laws
and laws regulating intellectual property rights.
The prospect of establishing a free trade regime with the EU,
combined with increased EU support and assistance for
Azerbaijan’s WTO accession, could stimulate the Azerbaijani
government to speed up its economic and trade reforms.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Visa facilitation
Another effective policy carrot available to the EU is agreement on
visa facilitation, with the possibility of visa-free movement in the
medium term. This measure would be especially important for
promoting person-to-person contacts, cultural, scientific and sports
interactions, and mutual knowledge exchange. Currently,
obtaining an EU visa is a costly and often lengthy process for
Azerbaijani citizens. In early 2008, the cost of Schengen visas was
almost doubled from 35 to 60 Euro, which prompted the
Azerbaijani government to retaliate by increasing the cost of its
own visas for EU citizens.
By comparison, Russia exerts significant soft power on
Azerbaijan by having an effective visa-free and free-trade regime.
The prospect of visa-free relationship with the EU constitutes an
important part of the EaP proposal, and was widely well received
in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan action plan also vaguely mentioned
“exchang[ing] views on visa issues” and “initiat[ing] dialogue on
readmission which could possibly lead in the future to an EC-
Azerbaijan agreement in this area.”
Visa facilitation requires first of all effective and integrated
border management at the national and regional levels (at least
with Georgia, if excluding Armenia), in order to diminish illegal
migration. This in turn necessitates making border guard service
“Schengen-compatible”, or conducting reforms aimed at bringing
Azerbaijan’s laws and procedures in the area of migration and
border management up to European standards.
Some progress has already been achieved in this regard. In
October 2007, the EU endorsed a three-year South Caucasus
Integrated Border Management program, aiming at theEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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introduction of EU border management standards in the South
Caucasus. The program consists of one common training
component, two bilateral cooperation components spanning
Azerbaijan-Georgia and Georgia-Armenia, and three national
components, enhancing strategic border management capacities
across the region with the goal of introducing coherent integrated
border management systems. The unresolved Karabakh conflict
prevents an integrated border management on a regional level,
which would bring Armenia and Azerbaijan together.
Visa facilitation would also require the conclusion of
readmission agreements, which would oblige the Azerbaijani
government to facilitate the return of illegal migrants and rejected
asylum seekers to its territory. On a broader level, this agreement
would also require further progress on the part of Azerbaijan in
areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law, and in
combating illegal migration and organized crime. By actively
assisting Azerbaijan in these reform efforts, while offering visa
facilitation as a reward, the EU would promote its own security and
would bring Azerbaijan closer into its orbit.
Financial assistance
Provision of financial assistance is yet another policy instrument
which the EU has successfully used in its external relations. But in
the context of Azerbaijan, increased government revenues from oil
exports relieves government from the need for financial aid and
cheap credits, correspondingly making it more difficult for the EU
to apply conditionality. In fact, in July 2008 Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev openly stated that his country did not need EU’s
cheap credits, as it has financial resources of its own (see
Rashidoglu 2008).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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In such a situation, the EU should pay greater attention to the
development of civil society in Azerbaijan by increasing funding to
NGOs, and by increasing educational exchange and support
programs. Educational programs, particularly with a view toward
harmonization of Azerbaijani education standards with those of the
EU under the Bologna process, are particularly important and
could serve as the most efficient long-term investment in
promoting democracy and Europeanization in Azerbaijan.
Currently, EU and Azerbaijani educational cooperation focuses on
two programs: Tempus, which envisages providing technical
assistance for the modernization of educational structures and
programs, and Erasmus Mundus, which provides scholarships to
graduate and undergraduate students. The EU should increase its
assistance to Azerbaijan within these projects, and bring it at least
to the level of neighbouring Georgia.
6
Enhanced role in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The success of EU policies and EU power in influencing
Azerbaijan will largely depend on the Union’s contribution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. As discussed above, EU’s
“wait-and-see” approach is a self-defeating strategy undermining
its credibility and policies in the region. While recognizing that
there are no single quick-fix solutions to the existing “frozen
conflicts” in the region, the EU should avoid statements which
antagonize Azerbaijan, such as suggesting that the EU does not
support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in the same manner that it
supports that of Moldova, Georgia or Ukraine.
6 For example, although Azerbaijan is twice as large as Georgia, the EU provided
only 26 scholarships for Azerbaijan for the year 2008 under the Erasmus Mundus
External Cooperation Window, as opposed to 58 scholarships for Georgia.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Fundamentally, the effectiveness of EU conflict resolution
efforts in the South Caucasus in general, and in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict in particular, depends on the EU having a clear
vision for the region. This is an issue which relates to a whole
gamut of larger questions ranging from the level of EU ambition
vis-à-vis its eastern neighbourhood to the EU’s own internal
dynamics, with an additional range of issues to consider ranging
from enlargement fatigue, the prospects for the new EU
constitution and improved Common and Foreign Security Policy
(CFSP).
End of ambiguities and start of a new strategy
On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s level of ambition with respect to
EU integration will largely depend on the success of EU policies in
Ukraine and Georgia, as well as Turkey’s membership progress.
As long as uncertainty regarding Turkey’s accession remains,
instability in Georgia and Ukraine continues, and the EU grapples
to devise coherent policies vis-à-vis these issues, Azerbaijan’s
skepticism of the EU will persist and grow. By contrast, Turkey’s
accession to the EU, and successes by Ukraine and Georgia,
Azerbaijan’s strategic partners in the eastern ENP region, in
integrating with the EU, would encourage and even compel the
Azerbaijani government to seek a similar level of cooperation with
the EU.
Thus, the EU should retain its regional approach, providing
equal integration opportunities to aspiring eastern partners, and
applying the same criteria in assessing their progress. However,
the EU should also employ a more evident multi-speed strategy in
its dealings with the eastern partners. This “equal opportunity,
multi-speed” approach would serve to maximize the EU’s softEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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power and would allow for a positive rivalry, whereby Azerbaijan
would “compete” with its partners from the eastern ENP in
adoption of EU norms and practices, so as not to lag too much
behind, particularly with respect to its immediate neighbours of
Armenia and Georgia.
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The EU and Georgia: The Choice is in the
Context
Kakha Gogolashvili
I. Introduction
Georgia has long been a country with European aspirations. But it
is still struggling with the legacy of a post-Soviet legal and political
culture, with weak market institutions, and a low scaled economic
and social development. It is thus unlikely to expect a rapid
transformation. Nonetheless, Georgia has attempted to put itself
on a track toward permanent rapprochement and gradual
integration with the EU. Accession to the EU is considered to be a
long-term goal.
In Georgia, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is
considered to be a proper tool for EU engagement in the process
of Georgia's reforms, and a good institutional anchor making
deviation from the “European way” less likely. The ENP opens
opportunities for the expansion of trade with the EU, and holds the
potential for a new level of political relations, including cooperation
in CFSP-related issues, and the development of stronger
partnerships in science, education, sectoral policies, and other
areas.
The ENP also serves as an institutional anchor for Georgia's
political and economic reforms. Participation in the ENP ensures
that the process of reform can be subordinated to something
broader than national policy. The ENP creates soft externalEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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guarantees that the reform process will continue on the correct
path, no matter which government comes to power. The ENP also
makes Georgia a participant in a wider international process, in
which each country, and Georgia in particular, may contribute by
supporting and deepening the stability and cooperation incentives.
This makes the country responsible for changes on an
international level.
II. Georgia’s aspirations
In Georgia, the current and widespread national understanding
that EU membership is a conditional objective became clear after
the EU’s fifth wave of enlargement, which was based on well-
defined criteria for accession. These criteria for EU accession
largely match Georgian policymakers’ overall goals and include
the creation of a modern, stable state with well-developed
democratic institutions, securing a functional market economy,
maintaining a good international position, and a respectable level
of human and social development. Indeed, the so-called
Copenhagen Criteria specifying conditions for prospective EU
members, as well as the associated pre-accession tasks, focus on
detailed institutional reforms designed to transform candidate
countries into fully EU-compatible states.
Public perception of the EU in Georgia
A majority of Georgians believe that the country has a “future in
Europe.” Public opinion polls carried out in Georgia since the mid-
1990s have persistently shown very high public trust accorded to
European institutions, and substantial interest in EuropeanEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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integration. The last public opinion poll carried out in the country,
during the most recent presidential elections (January 2008),
asked the population’s view of Georgia’s integration in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Seventy seven
percent voted in favor of membership (Georgian Central Election
Commission 2008). Different sources indicate that the NATO and
EU perspectives resonate strongly among the Georgian public
consciousness, and this figure may consequently be expanded to
the question of Georgia’s further rapprochement with the EU.
While public opinion is very pro-European in general, there are
some factions in the government and ruling elite that are more or
less skeptical of the conditions set by the EU. Not all
recommendations provided by EU advisers and EC missions are
considered necessary. Divergences that may hinder Georgia’s
advancement in the implementation of its ENP Action Plan, and
consequently the country’s closer integration with the EU,
basically relate to national economic policy. Such fields as labor
code, food safety and phytosanitary control, quality control of
industrial goods, competition rules, consumer rights and
environmental rules may hinder advancement of institutional ties
with EU.
Diverging goals?
Through the last few years of intensive reforms and development,
Georgia has introduced many democratic and liberal changes, but
these have not always matched the EU approach. Economic
policy dedicated to softening businesses’ administrative and
regulatory burdens has to some extent ignored commitments
made in the 1999 Georgia–EU Partnership and CooperationEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Agreement (PCA), which aimed at harmonizing Georgian
legislation with that of the EU.
The ENP Action Plan implementation progress report by the
EC indicated that “... the implementation of the Action Plan has
revealed the difficulties in reconciling the government’s drive for a
radical reduction of the role of government in the economy and the
EU regulatory approach reflected in the Action Plan”, (EC 2008:
2), EC reports on the implementation of the EU-Georgia Action
Plan of 2007 have been critical in such areas as migration policy,
competition policy, the presence of an independent judiciary, labor
rights and food safety (ibid.).
Indeed, it seems increasingly unlikely that the ENP Action
Plan, designed to be implemented over five years, with promises
by the Georgian government to do so in just three years, will in
fact be realized in such a time frame. The government’s ultra-
liberal economic policy, taking “deregulation” as a founding
principle, has conflicted with ENP Action Plan commitments.
There is still a lack of understanding of the importance of
compliance with all topics of the Action Plan, if real progress on
the way to closer integration with the EU is desired.
III. The EU’s Caucasian “dance”
1
The EU has based its relations with South Caucasus nations on
the far-reaching ideological objectives of promoting democratic
state-building and encouraging conditions favorable to a stronger
economic engagement, primarily through trade and investment.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
94 | The EU and Georgia
Russia in particular and the United States to a large extent are
each motivated by geopolitical interests in their foreign policies;
the EU does not ignore such interests, but places more emphasis
on other issues, like governance, development, values and
democracy.
Goals and values of EU foreign policy
The EU has no national idea on which it can base its own external
policy. Rather, the EU's policy ambitions are strongly dependent
on the commonly agreed values and objectives, driving ideas and
forces of European integration, such as Article 6 of the Treaty
Establishing the EU. Consequently any EU strategy is aimed at
satisfy the criteria of promoting stability, peace, democracy, a
market economy and so on. If these criteria are met, a project is
analyzed from the point of view of its humanitarian, political,
security, economic, and cultural potential, along with other
relevant objectives and targets.
Naturally, the order of consideration of these factors may differ
due to their importance in particular cases. For example, in case
of any conflict within the proximity of EU borders, security may
become a first priority in assessing policy alternatives. Economic
incentives in the case of Mediterranean partnerships are usually
considered to be a main driving force of cooperation, while the
EU’s decision to enlarge toward the east, resulting in the
accession of Central and Eastern European states, was motivated
first of all by political reasons. In a number of external cases, the
EU has acted primarily out of humanitarian considerations.
However, in all such actions, the EU is ultimately promoting its
1 In the Caucasus, female and male dancing partners never come close enough toEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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own values regionally and worldwide, whether it does so openly or
not.
The changed relationship between the EU and Russia
As long as these objectives are practical, and the countries
involved agree to cooperate and fully follow EU “instructions,” all
other components of European foreign policy can work
successfully. Otherwise, the EU faces problems in reaching its
external political objectives. Such problems have been evident in
EU policy toward Russia, which before the Putin era showed great
interest in finding common political ground, and in becoming a
credible partner for the EU. However, during Putin’s
administration, Russia has little by little abandoned the idea of
following European models of state building, returning instead to
Westphalia-style principles in international relations, hostile to
external criticism, intervention, conditions or recommendations
related to the country’s internal policy.
A common approach to the "post-Soviet space"
EU policy in the South Caucasus region has been a classic
demonstration of its approach to foreign policy. Beginning with the
early 1990s, the EU used traditional instruments to provide aid,
financial grants, technical assistance, and other means of
assistance proportionally and fairly to the South Caucasian states.
The EU's approach to the post-Soviet countries (With the
exception of the Baltic States) as a body was similar across this
period. The main features of this approach included the use of the
unified technical assistance instrument TACIS (introduced as EC
financial instrument in 1992), the creation of similar programs like
embrace each other although their movements are highly synchronized.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Food Security and Exceptional Financial Assistance, and the
development of framework agreements, or Partnership and
Cooperation agreements (PCA).
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
In 1994, all three states of the Caucasus began negotiating PCAs,
which have since been signed and endorsed, with the same dates
for all three. In fact, the agreements were roughly similar, with very
narrow differences tied to the specific national circumstances
(Yakobashvili and Gogolashvili 2006). This was probably the first
serious attempt to introduce sub-regional distinctions into
agreements with former Soviet states, as Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus began negotiating their PCAs earlier (1992–
1993), and ultimately settling on texts that were slightly different
than those offered to the South Caucasian states.
The most important difference in the agreements was a clause
allowing consultation on possible Free Trade Agreements (FTA)
between the EU and the three states. The clause was not included
in the agreements with Georgia, Azerbaijan or Armenia, despite
intensive negotiation efforts by the Georgian delegation
2. In reality,
the inclusion of the FTA clauses appeared to have little practical
effect, as in 1999 Ukraine insisted on commencing free-trade
consultations with the European Community, and the EC was very
strict in rejecting the possibility.
The Soviet legacy
It is also an interesting detail that the Georgian delegation insisted
on describing formerly Soviet countries, in the preamble of the
2 The author of this paper was a member of Georgian PCA negotiation team from
1994 to 1996.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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agreement, as “those which emerged or reestablished their
independence after dissolution of the Soviet Union.” The EC
delegation nearly agreed to such a formulation, but some member
states ultimately proved reluctant to describe any former Soviet
country as having “reestablished the independence.” It is difficult
to understand the precise reason for this, as the minutes and
conclusions of the Council working group meetings were not
available to the wider public, but it can be understood as fear on
the part of the EU to perpetuate Russia’s legacy into the post-
Soviet environment.
If the EU had agreed on this formulation, it would also have
required a differentiated approach to different states, as ultimately
happened with the Baltic States. All the above-mentioned facts
prove that the EU was strongly inclined to treat Georgia and all
South Caucasian states in the context of their role as former
Soviet Union republics, with some, but not substantial, differences
among them.
Emerging sub-regional differences
The differences came anyway. A new EU policy, the “Wider
Europe – New Neighbourhood Initiative”, which was launched in
2003, initially did not envisage the inclusion of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia (EC 2003). This changed in June 2004,
when, for several reasons "the Council noted the
recommendations of the European Parliament, the Commission,
SG/HR and the EU Special Representative for the South
Caucasus and decided to include Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia in the ENP" (Council of the EU 2004: 12).
Thus, the inclusion of the South Caucasian states in the ENP
could be considered as a new stage in the EU's engagement inEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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the region. It is important that this decision was made after two
important factors appear—Russia’s reluctance to join the
European Neighbourhood Initiative (which later became the ENP)
and Georgia’s Rose Revolution at the end of 2003. The first
probably revealed Russia's ambition to conduct a fully
independent policy and develop its own strategy and instruments
for rebuilding influence over the post-Soviet space. The second
fact signaled to the EU that new perspectives and aspirations
inside Georgia might offer greater hope for development and
democratic change in the South Caucasus region as a whole.
The Caucasus – not yet a neighbour
The EC communication establishing the basis for the Wider
Europe Initiative may help explain why the South Caucasus region
was not initially included in the ENP. As the official reason stated:
“Given their location, the South Caucasus therefore also falls
outside the geographical scope of this initiative for the time being”
(EC 2003: 4). From this communication, we learn that the ENP
was envisioned as a practical response to new challenges posed
by unprecedented EU enlargement. That enlargement brought the
borders of the Union close to the western borders of post-Soviet
space.
The Caucasus region was not at that stage considered to be a
direct EU neighbour. But was this the sole—or a sufficient—
reason for excluding South Caucasian states from the policy?
Indeed, the Mediterranean, predominantly Arab states, along with
Israel, similarly lack a land border with the EU, but they were
included in the policy nonetheless. We can surmise that by that
time it had become necessary to include the South Caucasus in
the club of the EU's closest neighbours, but policymakers stillEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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hoped to have Russia as a reliable and non-aggressive partner. It
thus appeared more practical to continue working with these
countries on the basis of their PCAs, avoiding irritating Russia
while still defining a new framework of relations with the important
regional actors.
Russian interests
The hope to have Russia as a close partner, and to explore all
possibilities together, including (presumably) those affecting the
South Caucasian region, was based on the May 2003 EU-Russia
St. Petersburg Summit, at which the EU and Russia agreed to
reinforce cooperation by creating four “common spaces” (EU–
Russia Common Spaces 2008). This summit followed the EC’s
March 11 Communication on a Wider Europe, and was obviously
an attempt to create a separate bilateral framework for new
relations after it became apparent that Russia was resistant to the
idea of being considered no more than one of a number of EU
neighbours.
Further developments showed that Russia's ambitions lay far in
advance of being a simple EU partner, with Russian anxiety
increasing due to Western plans to encourage an East-West
Energy corridor through the South Caucasus. This would include
the construction of the Baku-Erzerum Gas Pipeline, as well as the
development of other projects designed to transport hydrocarbons
from Central Asia to Europe across the Caspian Sea.
Energy Supply
At that time, Russia strongly opposed such ideas, acting to erect
different barriers to the solution of disputes on the status of the
Caspian seabed among littoral states. The country refused to joinEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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the European Energy Charter, and began evidencing a strong
desire to remain an independent actor, with the power to dictate its
own rules of supply. This fact inspired the EU to work out a special
strategy, the EC Green Paper on energy policy of 2005, which
outlined basic targets for energy security (EC 2006a). Among
these goals was a substantial diversification of oil and gas supply
routes in which the South Caucasus would play a major role.
Several future pipeline projects that were to go through
Azerbaijan and Georgia had already been developed. These
projects include the reinforcement of the South Caucasian gas
Pipeline (SCP), the Shah-Deniz (planned for completion in 2009–
2010), the Trans-Caspian gas Pipeline (TCP) connecting Turkmen
and Kazakh gas fields with Europe, and the Nabucco gas pipeline
linking Iranian and Caspian pipeline options, which would diversify
supplies in Europe by reaching the Austrian hub of Baumgartner.
In the last few years, several different options for transporting
trans-Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe via the South Caucasus
region, the Black Sea and Ukraine have also emerged.
These projects, while highly interesting for Europe, were at
odds with Russia’s strategic plans. This was an obvious reason for
the EU to abandon its previously homogeneous approach to the
former Soviet region, and include some of these countries in the
ENP. The South Caucasus, as a very important region, appeared
to be host to controversial interests on the part of both the EU and
Russia. It was thus logical to include all three South Caucasian
states in the policy, which allows the EU to develop a special
partnership that may ultimately play a crucial role in the EU’s
energy security.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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As time progressed, these sub-regional contexts were further
developed by the EU in new formats. Starting from 2006 (when
the action plans with the South Caucasian states were signed),
EC documents related to the ENP do not mention the South
Caucasus in a separate context (EC 2006b: 10), but mainly in the
context of the Wider Black Sea region (ibid. and EC 2007), which
includes EU member states, western members of the former
Soviet states, the South Caucasus countries and Turkey. Russia
is to some extent considered to be part of that regional approach,
but in practice plays little or no role in the EU-dominated process
of Europeanization. The regional cooperation envisioned in the
EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan, endorsed in November 2006, is
aimed primarily at projects that deepen joint activities in the Black,
Baltic and Caspian Sea areas.
The Black Sea as new framework
Since the EU has now become part of the Black Sea region itself,
Georgia’s active involvement in Black Sea cooperative efforts
offers the chance to tighten relations with the EU, as well as a
potentially stable path toward EU integration. The EU’s
engagement in cooperative efforts around the Black Sea in the
areas of infrastructure development (oil and gas pipelines),
security and stability (cooperation on border protection, and anti-
terrorist, military, legal and conflict resolution issues), scientific
projects, educational development, and environmental projects will
inevitably allow the region to develop into a “European area of
stability, security and justice.”Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Eastern Partnership
Another serious step in shaping a new regional scope of
cooperation and the EU’s involvement in the wider region of
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is the emerging Eastern
Partnership. Basic outlines of this new initiative were announced
at the European Council of May 28, 2008 apparently as a
Swedish-Polish response to French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s
idea of a “Mediterranean Union.” There was a similar, although
unsuccessful attempt in 2006 to reinforce the Eastern Dimension
of the European Neighbourhood Policy—the initiative called “ENP
plus”—“... a term being used by the German Presidency, without
this being defined in a public document in operational detail"
(Emerson/Noutcheva/Popescu 2007: 2). On December 3, 2008,
the EC Communication on Eastern Partnership was approved by
the Council.
The Prague Summit of 7th of May 2009 officially launched the
new policy. The policy will create better conditions for adopting
and implementing concrete projects of cooperation and widen the
framework of relations with following key elements:
• Signing the Association Agreements;
• Establishing better market access and free trade via deep and
comprehensive free trade agreements;
• Promoting higher mobility via mobility and security pacts
comprising visa facilitation agreements, visa-free travel in a
longer run;
• Working on energy security;
• Supporting regional development, including transport and
energy infrastructure.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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New policy without Russian veto
It is important to see that the multilateralism proposed by the
Eastern Partnership gives the EU full carte blanche in developing
closer trade, economic, political or cultural relations with all or any
of its eastern partners, without any “permission” from Russia or
any other big actor. This policy is still in the initial stage and it is
difficult to ascertain its real prospects.
Looking at the evolution of previous approaches, it appears
that the EU’s new role along its eastern border, and all
intermediate sub-regional strategies, will ultimately merge into one
basic approach, in which—as mentioned in the ENP Strategy
Paper—relationships will depend on the concrete performance of
the neighbouring state and in particular “new contractual links, in
the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements, whose scope
will be defined in the light of an evaluation by the Commission of
progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plans” (EC
2004: 9).
However, the geopolitical importance or political orientation of
the country may still influence the rate of rapprochement. Georgia
is seen as a country of substantial geopolitical importance for the
EU. At the same time, it has strong European aspirations, and this
is not just the view of elites, but the will of the Georgian people.
IV. EU credibility in the post-war environment
Both the government and public opinion at large favor active EU
involvement in issues of conflict resolution. During negotiations
over the ENP Action Plan, the Georgian government presented itsEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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own version of the draft, in which the EU was envisioned as
playing an important mediation role in the Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. Since that time, the Georgian
government has consistently asked to have the EU more actively
involved, seeking support for Georgian positions vis-à-vis Russia.
Raising credibility of the EU
After the August crisis, in which French President Nicolas Sarkozy
(in his role as EU president) negotiated a settlement in the
Russian-Georgian conflict, expectations of seeing the EU firmly
present in the region have risen. This diplomatic intervention, and
the post-war civilian mission deployed in Georgia to monitor
Russian troops’ retreat from undisputed territories, have certainly
raised EU credibility in Georgian official and non-official circles.
The EU is now perceived more as a power that is able to and
interested in guaranteeing democratic freedoms, the sovereign
rights of countries, peace and stability.
This belief is not groundless, forged as it was by real activity
during the time of crisis. The acting president of the European
Council, the president of the EC and the high representative for
the CFSP all traveled from Europe to Moscow and Tbilisi several
times to stop the aggression against a sovereign country, and to
help negotiate peace. During the war, five other presidents of EU
member states came to Tbilisi to demonstrate their full support to
the Georgian people and to the country’s democratically elected
government. Later, more heads of state and governments of EU
members, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, traveled
to Tbilisi to express their support and offer promises to defend the
country against open aggression. The donor conference organized
by Brussels, which pledged 4.5 billion US Dollar for post-warEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country, was another
strong impetus strengthening optimism toward EU policy in
Georgia.
In search for a new role of the EU
Certainly, the war in Georgia changed the rate of EU activity
toward the region, and especially towards Georgia itself. The
Union’s engagement in the resolution process may extend at least
as long as the EU mission is allowed inside of disputed Georgian
territories. This mission, if succeeded will have a monitoring
function aimed at ensuring secure conditions for the safe return of
Georgian refugees to their homes, a demilitarization of breakaway
territories, ongoing peace negotiations and the reestablishment of
territorial integrity.
This last goal has been very openly expressed by various EU
officials and leaders, including High Representative for the CFSP
Javier Solana, who in his October 31, 2008 TV interview for
France 24 confirmed the EU is strongly determined not to allow
the disintegration of Georgia (Solana October 31, 2008).
The EU moderated Geneva talks between conflicting parties,
which have started late fall 2008 and continued during winter 2009
still have not brought tangible results. Indeed, this only existing
format has potential to develop into real productive talks only if the
EU continues to be an active supporter and mediator.
Resistance from Moscow
Unfortunately Russia and the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
separatist regimes do not show real interest for approaching the
positions and finding common positions towards a number of
important issues. They continue resisting the full fledge presenceEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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of international organizations in the conflicting regions,
demilitarization and return of refugees. Moreover, Russia started
building up military bases in both regions and practically
integration of the separatist enclaves into the Russian
administrative space by abolishing the state borders with them.
It is becoming evident that without very strong pressure from
the side of the EU and other international community actors a
solution of the problem is not expected for a long time.
V. Regional cooperation: state of play
The South Caucasian political environment will not lend itself to
trilateral (or multilateral) cooperation as long as the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is not settled. Since the 1999 Caucasian Summit
in Luxembourg, organized by the then-governing German EU
presidency, there have been no other high-profile attempts to
develop trilateral projects without first reaching settlement.
Georgia has tried to cooperate with both other South Caucasian
states on a bilateral level. However, there have been other
multilateral, regional cooperative efforts, in which Georgia has
taken part on an institutional or project-based basis.
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
The first and most promising framework aimed at establishing
cooperation in the Black Sea region seemed to be the most
appropriate framework for regional development. The 11 Black
Sea and adjacent states joined the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC) pact gradually. The organization has pursuedEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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development work both in specific economic fields and in building
institutions.
The following were identified as potential areas for the group’s
joint effort: economic development and trade, tourism,
telecommunication, environmental protection, agriculture and
agricultural industry, energy, science and technology, statistics,
health care, transport, and law enforcement Emerson/Vahl 2002:
1–32).
Working groups were created for each of the above-mentioned
issue areas, which are still functioning today. The organization
possesses a rather well-developed institutional structure, which
includes summits (meetings on the highest level), a Parliamentary
Assembly (since 1993); the Black Sea Trade and Development
Bank in Thessalonica; the Permanent Secretariat (based in
Istanbul); and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies in
Athens.
In addition, the BSEC framework has helped in the creation of
other forms of institutionalized cooperation, such the Association
of Black Sea Capitals and the Black Sea Business Council.
However, the BSEC cannot be considered to be a wholly
successful or efficient organization. It has implemented only
relatively minor projects. Moreover, almost no significant work is
being done toward the end of economic integration or free trade.
This may in part be due to the fact that the participating countries
belong to different economic and political unions.
BSEC and EU
Incidentally, the EU itself did not welcome attempts by other Black
Sea countries, including Georgia, to discuss the establishment of
a free trade regime with Turkey. As stated in the Commission'sEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Communication Black Sea Synergy, “any initiative should take due
account of the fact that EU Member States and countries bound to
the EU’s common commercial policy by a customs union cannot
autonomously participate in regional free trade schemes (EC
2007: 7). BSEC member states including Greece—an EU member
since 1982—tried to involve the EU into this organization, at least
with observer status. To this end, the Platform for Cooperation
between BSEC and the EU was adopted in 1999, during Georgia’s
BSEC chairmanship, and was later formalized as a unilateral
initiative of the organization after unproductive discussions with
the EU.
In its Communication on Black Sea Synergy, the EC paid
special attention to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
as a framework for the discussion and development of multilateral
projects. Moreover, according to the Communication, “the wide
membership of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation and the fact that Russia and Turkey are its founding
members is a decisive advantage and could substantially
contribute to the success of Black Sea Synergy” (EC 2007: 9).
However, one should not hide the fact that there are tensions
between some BSEC members, in particular Ukraine and Georgia
on the one side and Russia on the other. These tensions severely
compromise the organization’s ability to develop a more ambitious
role, at least in the near future.
Sectoral cooperation in the Black Sea
Other frameworks for cooperation in the Black Sea region are
predominantly of a thematic nature, focusing on specific issues of
multilateral interest. Examples of this kind of cooperation include
transport and infrastructure development programs and projectsEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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such as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
(TRACECA) project, and the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to
Europe (INOGATE) program, mainly funded by the EC.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) is also active in the region. The main goal of these
projects is the safe transportation of goods and energy products
from Asia to Europe. The conference of European Transport
Ministers in 1997 also identified a new local area in the pan-
European transport network—the Black Sea Transport Area
(PETrA)—representing one of the prospective directions for the
development of trans-European transport corridors.
In order to implement the international convention “On the
Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution” of 1992, a
permanent small commission was established in Istanbul. The
Black Sea Environmental Program (BSEP) was established in
1993 as a joint effort of the United Nations and EU (Black Sea
Environmental Program Phase II). The goal of the program was to
develop a joint action plan for Black Sea environmental protection,
and to implement various activities toward this goal. Similar
environmental projects are being implemented with regard to the
Danube and Dniester river basins, Black Sea nuclear pollution and
other environmental issues.
Cooperation in security related issues
Cooperation between Black Sea littoral states in the security arena
is carried out in the framework of initiatives such as the Black Sea
Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor 1998). For this pact,
created on Turkey’s initiative in 1998, a multilateral treaty was
signed which supports cooperation between the naval forces of sixEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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littoral countries. Other regional forms of cooperation are being
developed as well, such as the Black Sea Harmony initiative.
Plans for increasing regional cooperation under the NATO
aegis (the NATO Black Sea Strategy) exist as well, although
according to the opinion of some researchers, Turkey is seeking to
reduce NATO influence in the region by means of its own
initiatives, in order to maintain control over this area together with
Russia. On the other hand, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine are
committed to the solid establishment of the northern Atlantic
alliance in the region (Simson 2006): 87–88). In addition, work is
being done with regard to the convention concerning fishing on the
Black Sea.
GUAM
The four-country GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova) has also increased its activities in the last two years.
Despite some reluctance being voiced by the Moldovan
government, this group has developed dimensions of cooperation
such as the new Baku-Supsa-Brody energy route, and free trade
arrangements among the member states. Georgia actively
participates in GUAM’s virtual center for combating terrorism,
organized crime, drug trafficking and other serious crimes, as well
as in an international association of GUAM member states’ law
enforcement agencies. An element of cooperation is the GUAM-
U.S. Framework Program on Trade and Transportation
Facilitation, Customs and Border Guard Control, Combating
Terrorism, Organized Crime and Distribution of Drugs.
Georgia has visa-free regimes and free trade agreements with
each of the other three members of GUAM. Similar arrangements
are in place with Turkey and all Commonwealth of IndependentEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
The EU and Georgia | 111
States (CIS) countries except Russia, with which all mutual
advantages were eliminated in 2006. Georgia’s post-war decision
to withdraw from the CIS does not affect its agreements with that
body’s member states.
New European Energy Corridor
The creation of a proposed “New European Energy Corridor” was
strongly promoted at a meeting of the heads of state of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, held in Krakow, Poland
on May 11 and 12, 2007. A working group is currently elaborating
concrete steps in developing this energy corridor, linking the
Caspian Sea with the Black and Baltic Seas. This project may play
an important role in the energy diversification of the East and
North European states.
Regional projects on energy and transport in partnership with
Turkey and Azerbaijan, such as existing gas and oil pipelines and
the Baku-Kars railway project, are especially important for
Georgia. Cooperation on transport-related issues is supported by
agreement on multi-modular freight transportation between GUAM
countries adopted at Baku GUAM Summit, June 18 and 19, 2007
(GUAM Agreement 2007). Georgia is very active in the South
Caucasus Anti-Drug Program (SCAD V), successful effort
combating drug trafficking.
A new EU-funded project, the South Caucasus Integrated
Border Management program, aims at harmonizing border
management practices at border crossing points. Georgia also
participates in multilateral cooperative programs such as the EU-
supported Regional Environmental Center, as well as efforts to
protect the Danube river basin, in particular by creating a system
of information sharing.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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VI. The Black Sea Synergy
The most promising framework for regional cooperation, which at
the same time represents a new dimension for EU policy, is the
Black Sea Synergy initiative formulated by the April 15, 2007 EC
Communication to the Council and European Parliament. This
initiative deserves special attention, and careful analysis.
The communication clearly defines the position of the EC
regarding active multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea region in
an innovative way. The South Caucasus region is not specifically
mentioned in the document at all, which is indicative of the fact
that on a practical level it is no longer being perceived separately
from the Black Sea area. Apparently the initiative is supposed to
be the primary conduit for EU intervention in the region for years
to come. The document outlines these main fields of cooperation:
a) Democracy, human rights and good governance
The EU will use training and exchange programs, and support
regional civil society dialogue. ENP Acton Plans already
emphasize all necessary aspects to be addressed in the
participating countries, and there is no practical need to adopt any
special additional approaches.
b) Managing movement and improving security
This includes the management of all kinds of trans-maritime
activities. In the eyes of the EU, the Moldova-Ukraine border
management experience shows that this process can encourage
conflict resolution as well. For example, EUBAM, the Border
Assistance Program of the EU, has been in place since 2005. The
EC is planning to propose a global approach to migration
management for its eastern and southeastern neighbours, whichEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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will be quite relevant for the Black Sea region. At the outset, the
EC is considering the creation of a joint Black Sea information
system for the management of cross-border crime and to use the
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which is a
regional center tasked with fighting cross-border crime, and the
Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BBCIC)
for these purposes.
c) Frozen conflicts
The EC advocates a more active role for the EU through
increased involvement in ongoing conflict resolution efforts. In a
communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, some authorities have argued that “ways of
enhancing participation such as monitoring” should be examined
(EC 2007: 4). In our opinion, this indicates that the EU might take
part in the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts
by taking on at least the status of observer. (During the Georgian-
Russian war in August 2008, the EU became actively engaged in
the process of conflict resolution. It has negotiated a ceasefire
agreement.)
The support of dialogue and confidence-building between the
parties is under discussion as well. We can fully agree that for the
moment, “The EU, which played an important role in mediating the
ceasefire and containing the conflict, has an opportunity to
upgrade its role in the Caucasus, including in whatever conflict-
resolution agenda might emerge from the new status quo in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (Antonenko 2008: 23–36).Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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d) Energy
The region is characterized as an important component of the
EU’s external energy strategy. The EC recommends that all
initiatives existing in this field should be carried out.
3 In the EC’s
opinion, the diversification and security of energy supplies is in the
interest of all countries of the region, including the EU. Here, the
EC is overdelicate in its actions. We can only partially agree with
this statement (given its tacit exclusion of Russia). Russia in
particular is an “aggressively conscious” monopolist of energy
supplies.
In the Commission’s communication, it is said that the EU will
seek to develop a transparent and non-discriminatory framework
for discussions on energy security. Legal and regulatory
harmonization with EU standards will gain key importance.
Significant attention is being paid to the development of alternative
energy sources, energy efficiency, energy saving and
infrastructure in order to achieve energy stability.
The diplomatic war with Russia
It is also noted that the EC is developing gas transportation routes
from Central Asia across the Black and Caspian Seas to the EU.
For this purpose, it will attract significant investment. However, the
document does not state how the EU plans to deal with the
problem of the Caspian Sea status. In all likelihood, the diplomatic
war with Russia over this issue will escalate even further. For
years, the EU has asked Russia to ratify the European Energy
3 This includes the Baku Initiative, the ENP and the energy dialogue between the
EU and Russia, the Energy Community Treaty covering Moldova, Turkey and
Ukraine, the Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan and Ukraine, as well
as partnership and cooperation treaties, trade treaties and the WTO.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Charter treaty, which stands for the free transit of hydrocarbons
from neighbouring states to third countries. Therefore, the EU and
all other countries in the region interested in developing
multilateral energy projects will have to face similar problems.
e) Transportation
This policy replicates the goals of TRACECA. The idea of
enhancing the Danube River as a transport option, and of using it
more effectively, is relatively new, but promising. This would
increase the importance of the Black Sea and Georgia in
particular. It is probably necessary to increase the interest of
Europe and the EC in particular in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway
route, which is not presently supported by the EU. The regional as
well as trans-regional importance of this route should be
emphasized. In the future, the ports of Poti and Batumi will not be
able to process sufficient amounts of European cargo. The railway
will promote engagement with the Turkish Black Sea and
Mediterranean ports, which will increase the cargo turnover
capacity of the Europe-Asia transport corridor.
f) Environmental protection
According to the EC plans, there are no novelties in this area
either, save for the statement that existing cooperation on the
protection of the Black Sea should be expanded, and that new
strategic approaches should be developed. The EC will try to
encourage work on global problems such as climate change and
the Kyoto Protocol as they manifest themselves on the regional
level. It seems that the existing frameworks for cooperation in this
field will remain largely unchanged.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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g) Maritime policy
The EU will support the unification of maritime policies throughout
the region, with the goal of encouraging coastal industry. The idea
of facilitating the establishment of regional clusters and joint
cooperation centers is also interesting.
h) Fisheries
Fishing and fisheries are among high-priority topics in the region.
The EU will attempt to support the reversal of poor fishery
conditions in some areas while promoting sustainable
development and production. It may encourage the countries of
the region to accept the introduction of EU standards.
i) Trade
The EU appears to want to encourage trade liberalization in the
Black Sea region by promoting the adoption of its own standards.
This is presented to countries of the region as a precondition for
the enhancement of integration. The aim is to reduce non-tariff
barriers that impede the free exchange of goods and services,
largely by approximating EU legislation and regulatory
frameworks. The PCAs, the WTO and the ENP all are considered
to be institutional tools supporting this process.
In addition, it is stated that countries that have established a
customs union with the EU may not automatically enter free trade
agreements with third countries. This provision would have
blocked the FTA negotiated between Turkey and Georgia.
However, the agreement was finally endorsed in October 2008,
with the EU supposedly agreeing to it on the grounds that this
posed an exceptional case due to the economic difficulties faced
by Georgia following the Russian invasion.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Converging legal and regulatory frameworks
It is noteworthy that in the future, five ENP participant states
(including Georgia) will gradually be granted free (deep) trade
regimes with the EU. That will certainly require a significant level
of convergence between their legal and regulatory frameworks
and those of the EU internal market. It is also significant that the
neighbourhood investment mechanism, in close cooperation with
the European Investment Bank and EBRD, will be used for the
development of infrastructure connecting the region (especially
energy and transport infrastructure).
j) Research and education
The Trans-European mobility scheme for university studies
(TEMPUS) represents the key instrument used in the countries of
the region for supporting higher education reforms. The use of
Internet and information technologies in business, trade and
scientific information exchange will be encouraged. In addition, the
EU will seek to link all the countries of the region with the pan-
European area GEANT data network. Scientific and technological
cooperation is proposed to take place under the auspices of the
EU’s Seventh Framework Program (FP-7).
k) Cross-border cooperation
In order to enhance cooperation between cities, local
governments, universities and non-governmental organizations,
three basic instruments will be used: the special instrument ENPI
– CBC (ENPI-CBC Strategy Paper 2007–2013: 20), the Regional
Development Fund (with reference to Romania and Bulgaria), and
Turkey’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)
comprising a Cross-Border Cooperation facility aimed atEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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intensified cooperation between Turkey and Bulgaria. The CBC
program of the EU is already functioning, and Georgian agencies
and organizations have applied to obtain funding for projects.
No separate organization
One more important question focuses on the role of international
organizations in encouraging cooperation across the Black Sea
region. The EC does not propose the creation of a separate
organization for the purposes of the Black Sea Synergy initiative,
but rather has suggested taking advantage of existing BSEC and
EU structures, in the form of high-profile meetings and ministerial
summits. Most probably the EC will take the status of observer in
this organization. It should be noted that the EU is called to use
both the bilateral cooperation format as well as various sectoral
programs.
The EU will also take advantage of other initiatives such as the
Black Sea Forum which took place in Bucharest on June 5, 2006.
The EC recognizes the ENP format to be one of the instruments
for Black Sea regional cooperation. It is directly stated in the
Synergy communication that "back to back with BSEC", the EU
will conduct meetings with ENP partners from the Black Sea
region as well. It is possible that a new “ENP plus” format will in
practice develop, in which, based on the regional themes, the EU
will conduct independent policy with former Soviet states
belonging to the ENP.
It is important to note that this new framework of relations on
the Black Sea does not imply Russia’s participation, as it is not an
ENP partner. If countries in this region with European aspirations,
primarily ENP participants, create a specialized forum where
problems of Europeanization are discussed and coordinated policyEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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developed, in our view the EU should surely promote such efforts
and take part in them.
VII. Threats to regional cooperation
Only rarely during the past two thousand years has Georgia been
able to enjoy the geographic advantage of its access to the Black
Sea. A far-east component of the Atlantic Ocean basin, the Black
Sea is linked with the “cradle of Western civilization”—the
Mediterranean Sea—only through a narrow passage (the
Bosporus and Dardanelles), which in various epochs has proven
to be more of a geopolitical lock than a channel connecting
peoples and regions.
Unlike the Mediterranean Sea or the Baltic Sea, forces
controlling the Black Sea have mainly represented continental
civilizations that served to impede the development of naval and
maritime trade activities. However, there have been times when
maritime powers have conducted trade up and down the coast.
The most significant damage to the ability of the region to
strengthen cultural and political relationships was caused by the
destructive war and ongoing tension between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire. Even in the 20
th century, the Black Sea was
considered to be an area of confrontation between the Soviet
Union and NATO. These circumstances impeded the development
of free trade relations. The subsequent lack of experience with
intensive economic cooperation and a division of labor in the
region does not favor the rapid growth of such relations in the
modern era.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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Absence of a common regional identity
After the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union,
the Black Sea littoral states were unable to quickly realize the
opportunities for cooperation they had lacked for centuries. In
practice, these states have been participants in several regional
processes, with few properly perceiving their role as part of a
united Black Sea region. For instance, Bulgaria and Romania
were categorized as countries of the Balkans or Southeast Europe
(the latter giving them status as EU candidate countries); Turkey
was viewed as a Mediterranean country and a player in the Middle
East; Russia was viewed as the leader of the CIS; Georgia was
perceived as a Trans-Caucasian state (part of the South
Caucasus at present) along with Armenia and Azerbaijan; and
finally, EC communications on European Neighbourhood Policy
treat Ukraine and Moldova as “Western NIS” (Newly Independent
States) that are economically tied with Russia, but seek closer
relations and even integration with Europe.
Absence of a common regional identity at today’s level of
political and societal development has erected barriers to genuine
cooperation between these states.
Open conflicts and Russia’s interests
Open ethno-political conflicts exist in Georgia (Abkhazia, South
Ossetia), in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and in Moldova
(Trans-Dnistria). Each of these conflicts involves Russia
simultaneously as a mediator and party to the conflict. This
peculiar contradiction is not sustainable, and first exploded in
Georgia in the summer of 2008, when after escalation of the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russia sided with Ossetia andEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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invaded Georgia from the North and the West. Conflict with
Ukraine is also possible, as it has become evident that Russia has
begun delivering Russian passports in rapid numbers to pro-
Russian citizens in Crimea, repeating a move it carried out in the
Georgian case.
European attempts to defend Georgian sovereignty and to
coerce Russia into withdrawing from disputed Georgian territories
may worsen relations between Russia and the EU. All these
factors lower the possibility that full-scale cooperation in the region
can be achieved. The “West” and EU in particular did not
“punished” Russia for the aggression against Georgia, it even
decided on continuation of talks on Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement after Russia withdrawing from undisputed Georgian
territories. At the same time EU institutions continue resisting
Russia’s attempts to “justify” the appropriation of Georgian
territories and building up of the military bases in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia (Presidency of the EU 2009).
New Russian policy seems determined to reestablish the
regional influence held in Soviet times. This has created serious
threats to the prospects for free and mutually beneficial
cooperation in the Black Sea region. Political objectives aimed at
halting the penetration of “Western” influences, enlargement of
NATO first of all and the EU as well, will very soon break the
climate of confidence and bring division and confrontation instead
of openness and trust. Because the Black Sea area constitutes an
important passage between Europe, the Caspian region and
Russia, the renewed geopolitical tension will see Russia trying to
prevent the EU from becoming an influential (even if soft and
positive) force here.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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The world financial crisis, which has already become a full-
scale economic crisis, may also limit opportunities to develop
major transnational projects, and force the postponement of the
most ambitious programs of cooperation. Lack of financial
resources, a decrease in demand and diminishing credibility on
the part of the countries involved will certainly create an
unfavorable climate for collective activity. Negative economic and
political factors might also push some actors towards isolationist
policies that would hinder the spirit of regional cooperation.
VIII. Outlook
Virtually all existing cooperative projects in the Black Sea area
suffer from a lack of political will, thus making it difficult for these
projects to embody full-fledged partnerships. As Russia grows
increasingly aggressive as an actor by aiming to dominate the
foreign-policy orientation of the region’s smaller countries, the
situation may further destabilize, which would clearly have a
negative impact upon the development of cooperation projects.
Stronger role of EU is needed
The EU’s advancement in the region has been strongly welcomed
by Georgia. Developing multilateral trade relations by establishing
free trade regimes in the Black Sea region is a tangible means of
speeding the process of Europeanization in the area. This will
primarily take place through the approximation of EU legal and
regulatory frameworks on the part of regional governments.
Starting with its intermediation in the Georgia-Russia conflict,
the EU should not abandon the opportunity to become a real actorEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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and mediator of the conflicts in Georgia and in the Wider Black
Sea area. By taking on a more active role in the region, the EU will
not only improve its image there but ease a wider acceptance of
the values and models of state-building that the EU tends to
promote throughout its neighbourhood.
Towards an individualized approach?
The EU has long maintained relations with Georgia within the
regional South Caucasian context. Georgia has frequently tried to
convince the EU to pursue a more individualized relationship, but
the primary framework for past relations—the PCA—did not
facilitate the implementation of policies different than those
regarding other South Caucasus nations, despite Georgia’s
progress or stronger “aspirations”.
What benefit would Georgia derive if EU policy were to be
based on an individualized approach? Certainly, it would acquire a
guarantee for a higher level of security, financial injections, trade
advantages, modern technologies, institutional development, and
higher standards of living. But Georgia’s economy is still very
small, which makes it difficult to attract strong EU interest. A
regional approach, as with the Black Sea region overall, may
improve Georgia’s opportunity in reaching higher levels of
industrial, agricultural, technical and commercial development.
This would in turn allow Georgia to make better progress toward
integration with the EU.
However, it is also fair to ask what Europe might achieve by
establishing closer relations with Georgia. First of all, because
Georgia serves as a bridge leading to the Caspian Sea and
Central Asia—and perhaps to the Middle East—Georgia could
take on a significant role in the architecture of European securityEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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as a close partner and ally of the EU (Lynch 2006: 69). Georgia
might also acquire an important place in establishing Europe’s
energy security and become a significant platform for the
dissemination of European values in the neighbourhood. All these
factors inspire hope for further progress in EU-Georgia relations.
The ENP opened the door towards a more individualized
approach. But it is probably the new EaP policy which may
contribute to a rapid Europeanization. The Prague EU Summit of
May 2009 officially launched the EaP. Georgia views with a big
inspiration its participation.
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Abbreviations
AP Action Plan
ACSE Armenian Civil Society Experts
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSEP Black Sea Environmental Program
Blackseafor Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
BSS Black Sea Synergy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
CFSP Common and Foreign Security Policy
EaP Eastern Partnership
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
EC European Commission
EIDHR European Initiative for democracy and human
rights
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EUSR European Union Special Representative
FTA Free Trade Agreements
GUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova group
IDP Internally displaced person
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in
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PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States
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What the Think Tanks Are Thinking
The South Caucasus
The Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) was launched in
December 2008. It is a monthly internet publication jointly
produced by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Tbilisi, the University
of Bremen, the Jefferson Institute and the Center for Security
Studies in Zurich. The CAD analyzes the political, economic, and
social situation in the South Caucasus. Recent numbers deal with
“NATO and the South Caucasus”, “Migration, Refugees and
IDPs”, “Energy” and “Democracy in the South Caucasus”.
The Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) is a
quarterly peer-reviewed online journal. This academic publication
is committed to promoting a better understanding of regional
affairs by providing relevant background information and analysis
on the region. The latest number (spring 2009) contains articles on
the chances and perspectives of the EaP and Georgia’s process
of transition.
In November 2008 Hans-Henning Schröder of the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) edited a book
entitled The Caucasus Crisis. International Perceptions and
Policy Implications for Germany and Europe. The entire
volume with its nine very detailed analyses and a valuable
chronology of the Russo-Georgian conflict is available online.
Some of the articles are also available in Russian.
In March 2009 the German periodical Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte” (ApuZ) published a special number entitled
“Kaukasus.” Specialists such as Uwe Halbach of the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, Walther Kaufmann of the Heinrich BöllEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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Stiftung and Manfred Quiring of the newspaper “Die Welt”
contributed analyses of the Russo-Georgian war and other
smouldering conflicts, and the progress of democracy in the
region. This publication is available only in German.
The Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
(BTI) is an international ranking of transition countries. It sheds
light upon the political and economic status of each country as
well as upon the political management performance of the relevant
actors. Detailed country reports provide information on the
underlying assessment factors for each country. The index
includes all South Caucasus and CIS countries.The new BTI is
due to be launched in the autumn of 2009.
The South Caucasus in the Black Sea region
The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) is an
independent research and training institute that focuses on the
wider Black Sea region (it has links with the BSEC). The ICBSS
regularly publishes Policy Briefs on issues related to the Black
Sea and the South Caucasus. In April 2009 Burcu Gultekin
Punsmann analysed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform (Policy Brief 13). Recently Yannis Tsantoulis from the
ICBSS provided a critical assessment of the differences and
possible synergies between the Black Sea Synergy and the
Eastern Partnership (Policy Brief 12). The institute’s Black Sea
Monitor provides brief commentaries and lists key documents,
publications and events of interest on a quarterly basis.
Recently the ICBSS, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Black Sea
Trust and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
(tepav) joined forces to establish the Commission on the Black
Sea. The Commission aims to contribute to a joint vision andEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
132 | What the Think Tanks Are Thinking
common strategy for the Black Sea region by developing new
insights into key areas. In 2009 the Commission is conducting a
policy-oriented study on the future of the Black Sea region, the
findings of which will be presented in a comprehensive report.
In 2008 Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott edited a volume
entitled The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century:
Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives, which contains
13 articles written by well-known European and American
specialists. The whole volume is available online.
In January 2009 Chatham House organized an international
conference on The Black Sea Region: New Conditions,
Enduring Interests. A summary and résumé of the debates is
available online.
The Black Sea Region: Clashing Identities and Risks to
European Stability is the title of a policy brief by Daniel Grotzky
and Mirela Isic of the Munich Center for Applied Policy Research
(CAP) which looks at the general and specific challenges that the
EU faces in dealing with the Black Sea region. It was published in
October 2008.
In 2006 Fabrizio Tassinari introduced the concept of a
“synergy” for the Black Sea in a CEPS policy brief, a ground-
breaking paper on the formulation of EU policy on the Black Sea
region
The South Caucasus, the EU and Russia
An EU strategy designed to change Russian attitudes and
behaviour, and at the same time to overcome suspicion and
hostility towards Russia in a number of eastern European states,
needs to be based on a set of actions capable of delivering clear-
cut and specific benefits. This is the starting point of a recentEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
What the Think Tanks Are Thinking | 133
report prepared by Michael Emerson at the Centre for European
Policy Research (CEPS) at the behest of the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Synergies vs. Spheres of Influence in the Pan-
European Space provides a candid analysis of the clash of
paradigms between the EU and Russia and suggests specific
types of cooperative action between the EU and cross-regional
groupings and between Russia, the EU’s eastern partners and the
Central Asian states.
Michael Emerson also wrote an early (though still useful)
analysis of the consequences of the war in Georgia, Post-Mortem
on Europe’s First War of the 21st Century, which was published
at the end of August 2008 as a CEPS Policy Brief.
Two recent policy briefs on the EaP have been issued by the
Bertelsmann Stiftung and ELIAMEP. Cornelius Ochmann
examines Russia’s reaction toward the EaP in a recent number of
the spotlight Europe series, and Helen Wallace of the London
School of Economics has published an analysis of The European
Union and its Neighbourhood:Time for a Rethink (ELIAMEP
thesis). Both policy briefs appeared in May 2009.
In April 2009 the European Policy Centre (EPC) published
another volume in its series of EPC Issue Papers, After Georgia:
conflict resolution in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. The
four authors are of the opinion that the EU has only gradually
developed the appropriate tools and the political will to play a
greater role in the whole of the eastern neighbourhood. All too
often the Union remains a fundamentally reactive player, without
the political will, the clear strategic vision and the adequate
capacity to engage in the proactive and effective prevention,
management and resolution of conflicts in this region. What isEurope in Dialogue 2009/01
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needed is a coherent and comprehensive ‘Eastern Neighbourhood
Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy’ embraced by all of
the EU institutions and member states.
In February 2009 Stefan Meister and Alexander Rahr of the
German Society for International Politics (DGAP) published a lucid
analysis of the recent state of relations between the EU and
Russia, The EU-Russia relationship at a turning point,
DGAPaktuell 2009/01.
… and Turkey
Turkey is an important actor in the region. Tarek Hohberg of the
SWP has provided a detailed analysis of the Turkish proposals for
a platform of stability and cooperation, and the reaction of regional
and international actors, Eine Plattform für Stabilität und
Kooperation auf dem Kaukasus? Chancen und Grenzen einer
Initiative türkischer Regionalpolitik SWP-Diskussionspapier.
The paper is available only in German.
The recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG),
Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,
addresses the potential for reconciliation in Turkish-Armenian
relations and identifies policies that both Turkey and Armenia as
well as external actors can adopt in an effort to support the
normalization process. The authors argue that reconciliation is at a
crucial stage and should be supported by active diplomacy,
detailed negotiations on a settlement and a carefully managed
historical reconciliation process. In April 2009 the European
Stability Initiative (ESI) also published a report on the cautious
rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, Noah's Dove
Returns. Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide.Europe in Dialogue 2009/01
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The Authors
Tigran Mkrtchyan has been the European Stability Initiative (ESI)
Research Analyst in Armenia since late 2007. He holds an MPhil
degree in International Relations from the University of
Cambridge, UK. He used to work as the Foreign Affairs Adviser to
the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia (2005-06),
lectured courses in International Relations and History at Yerevan
State University and was the Executive Director of the Armenian
International Policy Research Group-AIPRG (2007-08). His
research interests include international history, international and
regional security, and political theory. He has several articles
published in Armenia and abroad on international security and
theory.
Tabib Huseynov is an analyst with the International Crisis Group
(ICG), a global conflict prevention and resolution think-tank. As
part of his job he is responsible for conducting research and
drafting reports on political and conflict issues in Azerbaijan and
the wider Caucasus region. He regularly participates in various
dialogue and academic meetings related to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and the Caucasus region and has a number of
independent publications, including a monograph "Resolving
Ethno-territorial Conflicts: A Case for Mountainous Karabakh"
(Berlin, 2008). He holds an MA in International Relations and
European Studies from the Central European University in
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Kakha Gogolashvili is Director of EU Studies at the Georgian
Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS). He
holds academic degrees in economics, journalism and
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